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Corporate  Investment: 
Does  Market  Valuation 
Matter  in  the  Aggregate? 
DOES CHARTING  the course  of q-the  ratio of the market  value of firms 
to the replacement  cost of their assets-help  in predicting  investment  by 
nonfinancial  corporations?  This study  seeks  to answer  this  question.  In the 
process,  it also analyzes  the behavior  of the after-tax  rate of return  on 
capital  and  the lag from  new orders  for capital  goods to shipments  to ob- 
tain consistent  specifications  and  to check  on the compatibility  of results. 
Special  attention  is paid to the construction  and interpretation  of q and 
how it functions  in concert  with nonfinancial  variables  in the orders  and 
investment  equations. 
Balance-sheet  variables  and stock-market  appraisals  obviously  affect 
the cost  of capital  of individual  firms  as well as their  willingness  and  ability 
to invest. But their influence  on aggregate  investment  behavior  is less 
clear.  In fact, studies  conducted  up to the mid-sixties  generally  found  that 
debt-equity  ratios or debt-capacity  problems  had little discernible  effect 
Note: I am indebted  to Burton G. Malkiel, Charles  A. Waite, John C. Musgrave, 
Gerald Silverstein,  Robert W. Kilpatrick,  Cynthia  F. Wallace, Helen S. Tice, Murray 
F.  Foss,  Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates, Inc., for supplying data and advice. Special thanks are owed to my re- 
search assistant, Harry S. Watson, for performing far more than routine analytical 
tasks, and to my colleague, R. Jeffery  Green, for advice. Expert and selfless advance 
comments by the discussants, and other Brookings Panel members, saved me from 
several major errors. 
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on the investment  response  of corporations  to profits  and sales.' General 
developments  in the stock  market  were seen as reflecting  profit  and sales 
expectations  and credit conditions  without much independent  explana- 
2  tory  power. 
Since that time, however,  significant  drifts  in financial  variables  have 
occurred,  with  debt-equity  ratios  generally  rising  and  the market  valuation 
of firms  relentlessly  falling  relative  to the replacement  cost of their  assets. 
Furthermore,  James  Tobin  and  William  C. Brainard  have  recently  empha- 
sized that aggregate  market valuations  matter because "investment  is 
stimulated  when  capital  is valued  more  highly  in the market  than it costs 
to produce  it, and discouraged  when  its valuation  is less than  its replace- 
ment cost."3  They maintain  that q contains  important  information  about 
investment  incentives  that cannot  be conveyed  adequately  by traditional 
variables  such as interest  rates.4  Rather,  investment  incentives  vary with 
the difference  between  the marginal  efficiency  of investment  and the cost 
rate  of capital,  and  changes  in interest  rates  are  only one of several  factors 
that  may alter  this difference.  Since  these suspicions  about  the role of in- 
terest  rates may be especially  relevant  in the inflationary  and risk-laden 
environment  of the seventies,  it is time  for another  look. 
1. About a decade after the publication of  Franco Modigliani and Merton H. 
Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation  Finance and the Theory of Investment," 
American Economic Review, vol. 48  (June 1958), pp. 261-97,  which gave a theo- 
retical justification  for the use of balance-sheet  and market-value  data, they became 
more common in  aggregate investment equations and in estimating appreciation 
rates in expressions  for the nominal cost of capital and for the unit rental of capital. 
The first empirical use of q-type variables appears to have been made by Yehuda 
Grunfeld, "The Determinants of  Corporate Investment,"  in Arnold C. Harberger, 
ed., The Demand for Durable Goods (University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 211- 
66, and Alan Greenspan, "Stock Prices and Capital Evaluation,"  in American Sta- 
tistical Association, Proceedings of  the Business and Economic Statistics Section 
(1959), pp. 14-26. 
2.  For instance, Robert W. Resek used stock-market  indexes simply as a leading 
indicator  of expected output. See his "Investment  by Manufacturing  Firms: A Quar- 
terly Time Series Analysis of Industry Data," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol. 48 (August 1966), pp. 322-33. 
3. William C. Brainard  and James Tobin, "Pitfalls in Financial Model Building," 
American  Economic Review, vol. 58 (May 1968), p. 104. 
4.  See James Tobin and William C. Brainard, "Asset Markets and the Cost of 
Capital," in  Bela Belassa and Richard Nelson,  eds., Economic Progress, Private 
Values, and Public Policy, Essays in Honor of William  Fellner (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland, 1977),  pp. 235-62,  especially p. 236. See also John H. Ciccolo, Jr., "A 
Linkage Between Product and Financial Markets-Investment  and 'q'," in "Four 
Essays on Monetary Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Yale University, 1975), pp. 39-45. George  M. von Furstenberg  349 
Interest  in the securities-valuation  issue does not spring  solely from 
scholarly  preoccupations  with the proper integration  of financial and 
"real"  variables  in macroeconomic  models.5  Rather,  if q is a powerful 
and leading  determinant  of investment  by nonfinancial  corporations,  the 
behavior  of that  variable  and  of the stock  market  to date  leaves  little  hope 
that the long-awaited  investment  boom will materialize  in 1978. On the 
other hand, if the significance  of q is primarily  microeconomic,  with 
changing  q differentials  guiding  the allocation  of investment  within and 
among  firms  and industries  just as changes  in relative  prices  do, then the 
absolute  level of aggregate  q would  have little bearing  on the outlook  for 
investment  in the short run. In that case, the difference  between the 
marginal  and average  q, rather  than the difference  between the actual 
level of q and  unity,  may  determine  investment  incentives  in the aggregate. 
If corporations  can expect  to raise  q so as to benefit  existing  shareholders, 
they  may  be inclined  to use retained  earnings  for new investments  in their 
business  regardless  of the present  level of q, as long as their  q is no lower 
than  that  of other  corporations.  Furthermore,  even if q is far  below unity, 
corporate  managers  may not reduce  retained  earnings  through  increased 
dividend  payout  if they believe  doing  so would  preclude  a rise in q. 
By way of background,  the first  two sections of this paper show the 
derivation  of q, of certain  tax-change  variables,  and  of several  other  vari- 
ables  with  which  q may interact.  The behavior  of the after-tax  rate  of re- 
turn on capital  will be used as a guide to constructing  the appropriate 
phaseout  pattern  applied to permanent  tax changes.  This analysis  also 
complements  the work of Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers  on 
before-tax  rates.6 
Specification  issues are examined  in the third section. To assure  that 
the lags selected  in the orders  equations  are  consistent  with  the lags in the 
investment  equations,  the lags from capital-goods  orders to shipments 
are analyzed.  The resulting  estimates  may also be of considerable  interest 
by themselves,  since orders for capital goods (equipment) are an im- 
portant  indicator  of the investment  outlook  entering  into the leading  indi- 
5.  See James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium  Approach to Monetary Theory," 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,  vol. 1 (February 1969), pp. 15-29; Duncan 
K. Foley and Miguel Sidrauski,  Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Growing Economy 
(Macmillan, 1971);  and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "Money, Debt, and 
Economic Activity," Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  80  (September/October 
1972), pp. 951-77. 
6.  "Is the Rate of Profit  Falling?"  BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 211-27. 350  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1977 
cators of the National  Bureau  of Economic  Research.  Such orders  must 
be affected  before investment  can respond,  and variables  purporting  to 
explain investment  must be viewed with suspicion  if they or their lag 
specifications  do not function  in a way that is corroborated  by orders. 
With  this link clarified,  q can  be tested  on its own and  in conjunction  with 
other variables  in both the preliminary  orders  and investment  equations 
reported  in the  fourth  section. 
If q is influenced  by some of the nonfinancial  variables  included  in 
these  equations,  uninformative  estimates  may  result  from  the use of unad- 
justed  values  of q. The fourth  section  thus  examines  the information  con- 
tent of q. With q free from the influence  of nonfinancial  variables,  the 
fifth section focuses on the role of the residual,  presumably  financial, 
determinants  of q in capital-goods  orders  and  investment.  A final  section 
offers  a guarded  conclusion  about  the usefulness  of q in aggregate  invest- 
ment  equations. 
Quarterly  Estimates  of q for Nonfinancial  Corporations 
The measurement  of q is far from clear-cut  because  the literature  has 
used diverse  means  to approximate  both the market  value of firms  and 
the replacement  cost of incomplete  sets of assets. Furthermore,  some 
degree of arbitrariness  is inevitably  involved when net interest  paid by 
nonfinancial  corporations  is capitalized  to infer the market  value of the 
net interest-bearing  liabilities outstanding  or when noninterest-bearing 
financial  assets are netted against  the book value of the corresponding 
liabilities  to obtain an appropriate  addition  to the replacement  cost of 
fixed assets, inventories,  and land. For this reason the derivation  of q 
must  be explained  in some  detail. 
Since q is defined  as the ratio of the market  value of the liabilities  of 
nonfinancial  corporations  to the replacement  cost of their assets, the 
denominator  of q is obtainable  by adding  the net noninterest-bearing  fi- 
nancial assets to the replacement  cost of net fixed capital, inventories, 
and land, which are identified  as "other  assets"  in table 1.7  While quar- 
7.  Net noninterest-bearing  financial assets are calculated from unpublished  flow- 
of-funds statistics from the Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, 
dated March 19, 1977, as the sum of demand deposits and currency, miscellaneous 
assets, and net trade credit minus the sum of profit taxes payable and miscellaneous 
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terly data on financial  assets are available  from the flow-of-funds  ac- 
counts,  quarterly  estimates  of the replacement  cost of all other  assets  are 
obtained  by linear  interpolation  between  year-end  values.8  The resulting 
estimates  of the replacement  cost of all assets are shown  in column  3 of 
table  1. 
Once the noninterest-bearing  liabilities are netted against  the corre- 
sponding  assets,  there  remains  the sum of the net interest-bearing  liabili- 
ties and equity  on the liability  side. The market  value of these items  will 
be estimated  indirectly  although  direct  estimation  using  actual  price  quo- 
tations  for stocks and  bonds is entirely  feasible  in principle.  The flow-of- 
funds accounts  imply that the debt part of these items  is always  within  a 
few percent of the gross long-term  debt outstanding.  Hence, interest- 
bearing  financial  assets, defined as all liquid assets except demand  de- 
posits and currency,  plus consumer  credit, are about as large as the in- 
terest-bearing  short-term  debt.  Assuming  the interest  rates  on short-term 
assets and liabilities are also similar,  net interest  paid by nonfinancial 
corporations  can be identified  with the interest  paid on gross interest- 
bearing  long-term  debt. 
To obtain the market  value (MVD)  of the principal  balances out- 
standing  shown by net interest-bearing  liabilities (NIFL),  a stream  of 
coupon  payments  plus the repayment  of principal  at maturity  must  some- 
how be discounted  to the present.  While the yield on Baa-rated  bonds 
has been used in all previous  work for that purpose,  inspection  of the 
quality  distribution  of bonds shown in Moody's Bond Record revealed 
that the weighted average  grade of corporate  bonds outstanding  is A- 
rated  or slightly  better.  Furthermore,  no attempt  has been made  in previ- 
ous work  to determine  the appropriate  maturity  of long-term  debt;  rather, 
discounting  has been applied  presumptively  over various  time horizons 
ranging  from  five  years  to infinity.9 
8. Two successive end-of-quarter  values reported in the flow-of-funds accounts 
are averaged  to obtain estimates of financial  stocks for any quarter.  To obtain quar- 
terly stock estimates from the annual replacement-cost  data, one-eighth  of the differ- 
ence between two adjoining year-end values is added to the earlier year-end figure 
to obtain data for the first succeeding quarter;  three-eighths  for the second quarter; 
and so forth. 
9.  See Economic Report of the President, January 1977, p. 29; Ciccolo, "Four 
Essays," p. 28; and Tobin and Brainard,  "Asset Markets,"  p. 249. An average ma- 
turity of five years is assumed in the Economic Report, Ciccolo assumes an infinite 
life, Tobin and Brainard  adopt a twenty-year  term to maturity, and all use the Baa 
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To improve  on this technique,  I took samples  consisting  of between 
162 and 196 A-rated  bonds using the prices and amounts  of principal 
outstanding  reported  in Moody's Bond Record in five months: January 
1953, August 1958, July 1964, July 1970, and July 1976. Using the 
weighted  average  price of the bonds selected,  I then solved for the aver- 
age maturity  that would  yield this price,  given  the coupon  rate and  the A 
yield (AR) for the total nonfinancial  corporate  sector.  The average  ma- 
turity  was thus not calculated  directly  but inferred  as an item reconciling 
actual  market  quotations  with the present-value  formula  that  is supposed 
to yield them. To explain the weighted average  discount  on a mix of 
bonds, hypothetical  maturities  must be assumed  that are much shorter 
than the weighted  arithmetic  average  of their actual  terms  to maturity.10 
Thus,  the hypothetical  maturities  were  found  to be only five  years  in both 
July 1964 and  July 1976, but fifteen  years  in July 1970 as corporate  debt 
was lengthened  greatly  in the second  half of the sixties and shortened  in 
the first  half of the seventies.  The hypothetical  maturities  found  for Janu- 
ary 1953 and August 1958 were even less than five years,  but five years 
was  judged  to be a reasonable  minimum. 
One other  matter  must  be kept in mind  in calculating  MVD. Since  net 
interest  paid (INT)-rather  than  accrued-by nonfinancial  corporations 
is reported  at annual  rates in the national  income accounts,  the average 
annual  coupon rate is INT  divided  by NIFL2,  where the subscript  de- 
notes a lag of two quarters  since the interest  is paid semiannually  on al- 
most all bonds. Hence, MVD  is calculated  by using the formula  below 
with variable  maturities  cresting  at fifteen  years in 1970 before coming 
back  down  to five  years  in 1976 in a smooth  hump-shaped  pattern. 
(1)  MVD  =  (INT/AR)(NIFL/NIFL-2)[1  -  (1 +  O.  5AR)2t] 
+  NIFL (1 +  O.  5AR)-II. 
Both  NIFL and  MVD are  reported  in table 1. 
Estimating  the market  value of equity  is somewhat  simpler.  Like other 
studies,  this one uses the dividends  received  from nonfinancial  corpora- 
10. To illustrate the mathematics of aggregation, the t of a five-year bond and 
a consol, both with a 6 percent coupon and equal par value, is thirteen  years and not 
infinity when combined to a single issue of the same value if the required yield is 
9 percent. Similarly, the weighted arithmetic average maturity  of the A-rated bonds 
in the July 1976 sample was found to be twenty years, compared  with a hypothetical 
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tions divided by the dividend-price  ratio of Standard  and Poor's 500 
stocks  for this  purpose.  However,  this  method  is applied  only  to dividends 
paid  on common  stocks.  Preferred  stock  is treated  separately,  a distinction 
that  is required  because  its importance  has grown  rapidly  over  the  past  ten 
years, particularly  in the utility sector, and because the dividend-price 
ratio on such stock has tended to be twice as high as that for common 
stocks.  According  to calculations  made  with the Compustat  tapes,  9 per- 
cent of all dividends  paid by nonfinancial  corporations  were  paid on pre- 
ferred  stock  in 1975, compared  with  only  4 percent  in 1967."1 
Adding MYD  and the preferred-stock  and common-stock  values 
shown in columns  6 and 7 of table 1 yields the market  value of nonfi- 
nancial corporations  (column 8),  which is divided  by the replacement 
cost of their  assets (column  3). The resulting  ratio,  q, shown  in column  9, 
exceeded  unity only during  the period 1964:1 through 1966:2 and in 
two quarters  each of 1967 and of 1968. It reached  its lowest level since 
1952-53 in 1974:4 and then recovered  moderately  in 1975 and 1976. 
Even so, q was still lower at the end of 1976 than at any time during  the 
decade 1959-69, and it is obvious  that it has fallen substantially  in the 
three quarters  since. If q could properly  be interpreted  as a cardinal 
variable,  it would suggest  that the assets  of nonfinancial  corporations  are 
currently  valued  in the market  at less than 70 cents  on the dollar  of asset 
cost. 
Such an interpretation  is dubious,  however, because there are both 
statistical  and  conceptual  reasons  for the equilibrium  value  of q to be less 
than  one. Estimates  by the Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  of the replace- 
ment cost of assets  may not be entirely  suitable  for the purpose  at hand, 
since they do not reflect  the current  cost of putting  a given number  of 
efficiency  units  in place but instead  measure  the current  cost of the same 
amount  of resources  as was previously  used to produce capital goods; 
thus "costless"  technological  progress  is ignored. In terms of efficiency 
11. Burton G. Malkiel kindly arranged  for the dividends on common stock and 
preferred  stock to be aggregated  from 1956 through 1975 for corporations  in major 
two-digit industries accounting for about 80 percent of the total dividends paid by 
nonfinancial  corporations.  The percentage of common-stock dividends in total divi- 
dends was 95.5 in 1956 (also used for 1952-55)  and 91.3 in 1975, with 91.0 used in 
1976. The percentages obtained for the years 1957-74 were 95.6, 95.5, 95.7, 95.5, 
95.6, 95.9, 96.1, 96.4, 96.4, 96.3, 95.9, 95.0, 94.5, 94.1, 93.3, 92.4, 92.2, and 91.8, 
respectively. George  M. von Furstenberg  359 
units, even the cost of replacing  the net fixed assets entering  into the 
construction  of q would be overstated  unless the linear depreciation 
schedule  applied  by BEA fully compensates  for the rise in the efficiency 
of capital  inputs.  Furthermore,  even if the replacement  cost of the net 
stock  of capital  is correctly  measured,  q could  be less than  1 for an existing 
plant in a particular  application  and location and yet be greater  than 1 
for new investment  in an alternative  production  process,  product  line, or 
location. Since existing facilities are, in fact, rarely replaced  with like 
units  in the same  location,  there  is a presumption  that  the q ratio  of exist- 
ing  capital  is normally  less than 1. 
The investment  tax credit  provides  another  reason  for expecting  q to 
remain  below  unity  in the  long  run  even  for new capital. 
In equilibrium,  investment  will occur  up to the  point  at which 
(2)  q =MV/PK=  (-k) 
n 
-E  (I  +  r)-t{(l-6)t-1(l  + p)t[(l 
-  u)(REV/PK) +  uai] + udt}, 
t-1 
where 
MV  = market  value  of new  capital  invested  in the corporation 
PK  =  current supply price of capital (K) 
REV = expected  current  operating  income 
k  =  the rate  of the  investment  tax  credit 
u  =  income tax rate 
r  = financing  rate  for debt  and  equity  combined 
a  =  constant economic depreciation rate 
dt  =  variable tax depreciation rate 
a  =  constant  debt-financing  percentage 
i  =  the coupon  rate on debt 
p  = the expected  rate  of inflation  in prices  of output  and  capital 
goods. 
Equation  2 shows  that  investment  qualifying  for the credit  will be carried 
to the point at which its market  value is the same as its net acquisition 
cost to business,  which  is (1 -  k) per dollar  of K. Thus the equilibrium 
level of the marginal  q is not only less than  one, but falling.  As the invest- 
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is stimulated  because  the required  q has declined.  Eventually,  however, 
the actual  q will  follow  the  required  q. 
While  this  matter  may  be of some  consequence  to the study  of the vary- 
ing investment  response  to q of individual  firms,  it is not a weighty  matter 
in the aggregate.  Until 1975, the utility  companies  were  allowed  a credit  of 
4 percent  and others 7 percent;  the ratio of the investment  tax credits 
claimed  to the equipment  investment  of nonfinancial  corporations  was  be- 
tween 5 and 51/2  percent.  It was between 91/2 percent and 10 percent 
thereafter,  when firms  in general  were allowed 10 percent.  Since equip- 
ment constitutes  little more than one-quarter  of the net assets  in the de- 
nominator  of q, only about  a fourth  of these  rates  can be applied.  I there- 
fore divide  q by (1 -  k), where  k is 0.013 from 1962 to 1975 (with an 
interruption  due to the removal of the credit between April 1969 and 
August 1971) and 0.025 in 1975 and 1976 to reflect  the fact that, con- 
ceptually  at least, the equilibrium  value of q can be fixed at one only if 
q as conventionally  measured  is divided  by (1 -  k). 
Even so, enough  data  problems  remain  to advise  caution.'2  It cannot  be 
claimed  in any absolute  sense  that a measured  q of less than  one will dis- 
courage new investment  and encourage  the purchase of  second-hand 
assets (for instance, through  mergers), increased dividend payments, 
financial  investments,  and the repurchase  of a firm's own liabilities.13 
Still, one would expect  such  tendencies  to vary  inversely  to the level of q 
12. Although the measure  of q employed here is more comprehensive  than most, 
a number of corporate assets, such as the value of patents, copyrights, and mineral 
rights, are still excluded from the denominator.  The numerator is also likely to be 
understated  since the use of a stock-price  index broader  than Standard  & Poor's and 
the elimination of financial corporations from that index probably lower the divi- 
dend-price ratio. Furthermore, except when q is unity, its value depends on the 
degree of netting applied on the asset and liability sides. Extreme forms of netting, 
such as netting all financial  assets and inventories  against the market  value of equity 
and debt, have been suggested  by Russell Sheldon, "Some  Measurement  Issues Con- 
nected with Tobin's Financial Model" (Federal Reserve Bank of  New York, Re- 
search Paper 7624, July 1976;  processed), p. 15. 
13. Nor can it be argued  that a measured  value of q that is no greater  than unity 
necessarily proves that capital markets in recent years perceived nonfinancial cor- 
porations as having, in the aggregate, no  substantial opportunities for intangible 
growth. For analyses of this issue, see Daniel M. Holland and Stewart C. Myers, 
"Trends  in Corporate Profitability and Capital Costs" (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Alfred P. Sloan School of  Management, WP937-77, May 1977; pro- 
cessed);  and Stavros B.  Thomadakis, "A Value-Based Test  of  Profitability and 
Market Structure,"  Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 59  (May 1977),  pp. 
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in securities-valuation  models  of investment,  provided  that measurement 
error  in q does not change  over time. By allowing  for the changing  com- 
position  of equity,  for the investment  tax credit,  and  more  important,  for 
the changing  hypothetical  term  to maturity  of long-term  debt, I have at- 
tempted  to guard  against  time-linked  errors  in the construction  of q. 
Tax Changes  and Other  Explanatory  Variables 
To discover  how much q helps in explaining  the rate of orders  and of 
gross  investment,  defined  as real orders  or investment  as a percent  of the 
real gross capital stock of nonfinancial  corporations,  other explanatory 
variables  must  be introduced.  First  is the Federal  Reserve  index  of capac- 
ity utilization  in manufacturing  (CU)  as revised in November 1976. 
Similar  variables  have long served on the acceleration-oriented  side of 
the controversy  about  investment  determinants.  Since  capacity  utilization 
in nonmanufacturing  is not closely related  to CU, taking  this variable  as 
a proxy  for all capacity  utilization  is not entirely  appropriate.  Still,  assum- 
ing that the desired  utilization  rate is trendless,  a lower level should, on 
balance,  signify  reduced  willingness  to invest in the nonfinancial  corpo- 
rate  sector.  Since  the index  has never  advanced  very  rapidly  in peacetime, 
a low current  CU foretells a below-average  rate for some quarters  to 
come, making  additions  to capacity  less pressing.  On the other  hand,  its 
current  level should affect the expected profitability  of only the most 
short-lived  new investments  so that its interaction  with variables  influ- 
encing  the expected  rate  of return  should  be small. 
Among  the rate-of-return  variables,  inflation  and tax factors  stand  out 
if the effect  of all financial  variables  such as interest  rates  is assigned  to 
q. First, a surge  in the prices  of inputs  traded  in auction  markets  has two 
types of effects.  It encourages  nonfinancial  corporations  to order  before 
increases  in the costs of raw  materials  are  reflected  in the prices  of capital 
goods. Second,  it increases  the real tax burden  because  three-quarters  of 
the cost of inventories  used up is still calculated  on the FIFO basis by 
nonfinancial  corporations,  according  to preliminary  estimates  for 1976 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since changes  in the inflation 
rate are promptly  reflected  in the (negative) inventory  valuation  adjust- 
ment (IVA),  the expected  sign on IVA is ambiguous.  If inflation  is ex- 
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reduced  on account  of the tax increase  induced  under  historical-cost  ac- 
counting.  In that  case  the coefficient  on IVA should  be positive.  However, 
if the price bulge is held to be temporary,  the desire  to beat it through 
stepped-up  ordering  may  win  out. 
There is no similar doubt about the expected long-term effects of 
higher  underlying  rates of inflation.  A higher  rate of inflation  raises the 
percentage  shortfall  of historical-cost  depreciation  from  replacement-cost 
depreciation  over an entire  replacement  cycle. The extent to which the 
resulting  tax increase  is offset by the deductibility  of the inflation  pre- 
mium in interest  rates depends  on the degree to which assets are debt 
financed.'4  Furthermore,  inflation  also directly  hurts capital-goods  pro- 
ducers,  who generally  operate  in customer  rather  than  auction  markets,  if 
the markups  traditionally  applied  are  based  more  nearly  on the historical 
cost  than  on the replacement  cost of inputs.15 
Three  variables  are therefore  needed  to capture  the implicit  tax effects 
of inflation:  (1)  the IVA, (2)  the adjustment  of capital  consumption  al- 
lowances with consistent  accounting  from historical  cost to current  re- 
placement  cost. ICCA,16 and (3)  the ratio of debt to assets,  DIA. For 
14. Detailed discussions are contained in Henry J. Aaron, ed., Inflation and the 
Income Tax (Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 33-120; John B. Shoven and Jeremy 
I. Bulow, "Inflation  Accounting and Nonfinancial Corporate Profits: Financial As- 
sets and Liabilities,"  BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 15-57; and George M. von Furstenberg  and 
Burton G. Malkiel, "Financial  Analysis in an Inflationary  Environment,"  Journal  of 
Finance, vol. 32 (May 1977), pp. 575-88. 
15. Transitory investment stimuli may be  generated by  inflation because the 
nominal cost of capital is slow to adjust,  according  to Dale W. Jorgenson  and Calvin 
D.  Siebert, "Optimal Capital Accumulation and Corporate Investment Behavior," 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 76 (November/December 1968), pp. 1123-51, 
especially pp. 1126 and 1143. Tobin's q theory does not demonstrate  how inflation 
might affect the market  value of firms relative to the replacement  cost of their assets. 
By contrast, Okun views markup  onto historical costs rather  than replacement  costs 
as part of the rules followed to safeguard  established  customer-supplier  relationships 
in nonauction-type  markets. In that case a rise in the rate of inflation  to a new level 
would cause the real value of equity to decline though existing leverage would be a 
countervailing  factor until the average interest  rate on all outstanding  debt has fully 
adjusted  to the higher inflation rate. See Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation:  Its Mechanics 
and Welfare Costs,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 351-90. 
16. The  capital consumption adjustment (CCA)  reported quarterly for non- 
financial corporations is decomposed annually by BEA into that part of the differ- 
ence  between  historical-cost accelerated tax  depreciation and  replacement-cost 
straight-line  depreciation that is due to (1)  differences  in the depreciation  methods 
and service lives applied to historical-cost data (RCCA),  and (2)  inflation in the 
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proper  scaling  in regressions  of the rates  of capital-goods  orders  and in- 
vestment,  the first  two terms  are expressed  in percent  of the nominal  gross 
stock  of nonresidential  fixed  capital.  The last term  is obtained  by dividing 
the market  value of debt in column  5 of table 1 by the replacement  cost 
of net assets  in column 3. Normally,  the fraction  of the total return  on 
assets  that  is tax deductible  can  be expected  to rise  monotonically  with  the 
debt-asset  ratio and so can the redistribution  from existing  bondholders 
to equity  holders  that occurs when interest  rates rise because of unex- 
pected  inflation. 
It is probably  realistic  to treat the effects  of inflation  on taxes as un- 
anticipated  or as akin  to those of temporary  changes  in taxes themselves. 
Since the highest  rates of inflation  were experienced  toward  the end of 
the 1952-76 data period, the capital  stock has had little time to adjust 
even if the expected  rate of inflation  has risen  in recent  years.  However, 
this assumption  cannot be extended to permanent  changes in explicit 
taxes imposed  by statute,  to which the capital stock will adjust  barring 
offsetting  changes  in the gross  rate of return  on capital  through  induced 
cost increases  or margin  reductions  of the kind discussed  in the literature 
on short-term  shifting  of the corporation  income tax.'7 Specifically,  the 
investment  rate will be raised  for a time by permanent  increases  in the 
investment  tax credit,  permanent  cuts in corporate  tax rates,'8  and per- 
manent  liberalization  of depreciation  provisions.  In neoclassical  formula- 
tions the resulting  capital deepening  tends to reduce the gross rate of 
return  on capital  until  equilibrium  between  that  rate  and  the rental  cost of 
capital  is restored.  In the long run,  the rates  of both net and gross  invest- 
ment  would  be unchanged  although  the amounts  of both must  be perma- 
distributing  quarterly  the differences  in RCCA, which move quite steadily between 
statutory changes, and then solving for ICCA using the  identity ICCA = CCA 
-  RCCA. Changes in RCCA that are due to permanent changes in depreciation 
rules  were used to construct  one of the explicit tax-change  variables. 
17. For references  and an evaluation see Joseph  A. Pechman,  Federal Tax Policy 
(3rd ed., Brookings  Institution, 1977), pp. 129-36. 
18. In their article, "Application  of the Theory of Optimum  Capital Accumula- 
tion," in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax Incentives  and Capital  Spending (Brookings  Institu- 
tion, 1971), pp. 16-17, 53, Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson have suggested 
that a cut in the corporate rate will increase the user cost of capital and depress 
investment  by driving  up the required  gross marginal  product of capital if economic 
depreciation is below depreciation for tax purposes as it was during most of  the 
sixties. However, this deduction was based on restrictive assumptions  that are not 
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nently higher if a higher capital-output  ratio is to be maintained  in a 
growing  economy. 
A phaseout  pattern  must be applied  to all major  permanent  changes 
in taxes to represent  this process when the gross investment  rate (100 
times the real nonresidential  gross investment  divided  by the real gross 
fixed  nonresidential  stock  of capital  of nonfinancial  corporations)  is used 
as the dependent  variable,  as in John Ciccolo's  estimates  of the effect  of 
q. In other  words,  following  any  change  in tax  laws,  the resulting  change  in 
federal profits-tax  liabilities, again expressed in percent of the gross 
capital  stock, must be multiplied  by a factor that declines  from unity at 
the time of introduction  to zero over a period  of years as the adjustment 
of the capital stock is completed.  The phaseout  pattern  is dictated by 
the following  consideration:  the greater  the initial  change  in the after-tax 
rate of return  on capital, the greater  the desired investment  response. 
However,  decision  lags and delivery  lags prevent  an immediate  strong  re- 
sponse of investment.  As time elapses, the more investment  reacts, the 
lower the change  in the after-tax  rate of return  remaining  from  prior  tax 
actions  and  hence  the lower  the  incentive  to respond  further. 
Instead of searching  for the phaseout  patterns  that happen to yield 
the best-fitting  permanent  tax-change  variables  in the orders  and invest- 
ment equations,  I decided  to rely on findings  by others  and on the thrust 
of neoclassical  theory  for independent  information  on the proper  phase- 
out pattern.  Neoclassical  investment  models have often been predicated 
on the assumption  that the before-tax  discount  rate  is stationary  because 
the burden  of any tax on capital  is borne  by that factor  of production  in 
both the short and the long run.19  Hence, any general cut in taxes on 
capital  should  raise the after-tax  rate of return.  However,  since the cor- 
poration income tax applies to only about one-third  of net privately 
owned fixed capital, the rise in the after-tax  rate of return  will be far 
greater  in the short  run  than  in the long run  when  the risk-adjusted,  after- 
tax rates  of return  have  been equalized  on capital  employed  in all sectors. 
The effective  tax rate  on the return  on capital  has, in fact, declined  almost 
19. See ibid., pp.  16-18,  and Peter M.  Miezkowski, "On the Theory of  Tax 
Incidence," Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  75  (June 1967), pp. 250-62.  The 
assumption of  a constant before-tax discount rate may, however, be untenable in 
models requiring an increase in aggregate investment and not just a shift of invest- 
ment activity between different sectors. See Paul Taubman and Terence J. Wales, 
"Impact  of Investment Subsidies in a Neoclassical Growth Model," Review of Eco- 
nomics and Statistics,  vol. 51 (August 1969), pp. 287-97. George M. von Furstenberg  365 
continuously  during  the post-Korean  period,20  so that a gradual  rise in 
the equilibrium  level  of the after-tax  rate  of return  may  well be expected.2' 
The phaseout  pattern  then determines  how fast the actual rate is ex- 
pected to return  to its moving-equilibrium  level after  any permanent  tax 
change. 
To see which phaseout  pattern  is consistent  with the behavior  of the 
after-tax  rate of return  (ATR) on net capital (including  inventories  and 
land), that  variable  was regressed  on CU, on the change  in the unemploy- 
ment  rate  from  the preceding  quarter,  on time,  on the inflation-tax  changes 
involving  IVA, ICCA, and D/A,  and on the sum of all the variables  re- 
flecting  statutory  tax changes.  Two different  phaseout  patterns  were ap- 
plied to all permanent  tax changes,  one assuming  that the adjustment  of 
the capital stock to permanent  tax changes is substantially  completed 
within  five years, and the other assuming  that it takes seven years. Since 
around  98 percent  of the total variation  in ATR could be accounted  for 
with autoregressive  least squares  in both cases, there  was little to choose 
between  the two. However,  since the evidence  provided  by others  favors 
the faster  phaseout  pattern,22  I decided to use the variables  constructed 
with that pattern  in the investment  and orders equations.  This choice 
would  not be inconsistent  with  the behavior  of ATR if the investment  re- 
sponse  to permanent  tax reductions  is found  to peak  when,  or just  before, 
that rate recedes most rapidly  from its elevated  level, about two years 
after  any  change.  Runs  with  either  type of phaseout  pattern  and  an analy- 
sis of the overall  regression  results  on A TR are  provided  in the appendix. 
As reported  there, the total tax-change  variable  used in the equation 
20. The effective tax rate, defined as the ratio of accruals  of corporate  profits  tax 
to the sum of NIA  profits and net interest paid by nonfinancial corporations, de- 
clined from 50.8 percent in 1955 to 41.0 percent in 1976, with most of the decline 
occurring between 1955 and 1962. All three years named in this comparison  follow 
a respective reference-cycle  trough by one year. While the effective tax rate shot up 
to 48.1 percent in 1974 on account of the rise in taxable inventory  profits,  the normal 
level has remained  far below that of the fifties. 
21.  Unless, of course, the required  risk premiums drop by the same proportion. 
See William D. Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of Profits,"  BPEA, 1:1974, pp. 169- 
208. On the other hand, the finding by Feldstein and Summers that the cyclically 
adjusted  before-tax rate of return on the capital employed by nonfinancial  corpora- 
tions is trendless implies a rise in the after-tax rate of return if similarly adjusted. 
See "Is  the Rate of Profit  Falling?"  pp. 217-21. 
22.  See Robert E. Hall, "Investment,  Interest Rates, and the Effects of Stabiliza- 
tion Policies," BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 61-103; and Hall and Jorgenson,  "Application  of 
the Theory of Optimum  Capital  Accumulation,"  p. 41. 366  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
for the after-tax  rate  of return  on capital  is simply  the sum of the phased 
permanent  changes  due to changes  in rates, in the investment  tax credit 
or in depreciation  provisions,  and of temporary  rate changes.  Since the 
expected  effect of each of these measures  on capital-goods  orders and 
shipments  may not be proportional  to the change  in federal  tax receipts 
involved,  each of them  will be tested separately  in the orders  and invest- 
ment equations.  No phaseout  factor  is applied  to temporary  rate  changes 
so that the numerator  is always equal to the estimated  change in the 
federal profits-tax  liabilities of nonfinancial  corporations.  While tem- 
porary  tax changes  have the same initial impact  on the actual after-tax 
rate of return  and on cash flow as do permanent  changes,  they leave the 
profitability  of most plannned  investments  untouched.  However, brief 
suspensions  of the investment  tax credit,  such as that  from  October  1966 
to March 1967, can modify the quarterly  pattern  of orders  both during 
and after the suspension  period. This calls for the introduction  of a 
dummy  variable,  IC66, which is negative  during  the suspension  period 
and  positive  for a few quarters  thereafter.23  All other  tax-change  variables 
are  signed  by the change  in federal  tax receipts  they  produce,  with  tax cuts 
negative  and increases  positive.  Throughout  this paper,  tax-change  vari- 
ables,  IVA, and  ICCA, which  are originally  in current  dollars,  are scaled 
by the current-dollar  equivalent  of the divisor  used to construct  the de- 
pendent  variable  in any  run,  and  expressed  in percent. 
The  Lag  from  New Orders  to Shipments  of Capital  Goods 
As the appendix  demonstrates,  variations  in the actual after-tax  rate 
of return  on the net capital employed  by nonfinancial  corporations  are 
linked  to the cyclical  variables,  capacity  utilization  and  the change  in the 
unemployment  rate, and to the implicit (inflation-related)  and explicit 
tax-change  variables.  But how in turn do these variables  influence  new 
orders  of plant and equipment?  Any of them must affect orders  before 
they can affect  investment.  Furthermore,  since  shipments  lag significantly 
23. The value of the dummy was set equal to -0.9  in both 1966:4 and 1967:1 
since the suspension covered only about 0.9 of the first quarter  and even less of the 
second. The sign of  the dummy was then reversed. To allow the orders deferred 
during  the suspension  period  to be made up completely  within a year, the dummy  was 
set at 0.8, 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2, respectively, in the ensuing four quarters. George  M. von Furstenberg  367 
behind  orders,  the analysis  of orders  should  yield useful  insights  into the 
lag structures  appropriate  for investment. 
Unfortunately,  the statistics  on orders  are  not entirely  suitable  for pre- 
dicting  the investment  of nonfinancial  corporations.  Neither of the two 
"nondefense"  series, "contracts  and orders for plant and equipment" 
and "value of  manufacturers'  new orders, capital goods industries" 
(which  refers  to equipment  ordered  from capital-goods  manufacturers), 
is available  for nonfinancial  corporations  alone. Nonfinancial  corpora- 
tions account  for around  70 percent  of total nonresidential  fixed invest- 
ment.  Although  they  probably  generate  a similar  percentage  of all domes- 
tic orders  for plant  and  equipment,  the exact  figure  is not known  and  may 
oscillate  procyclically.  The two orders  series are both now available  in 
current  and  in 1972 dollars  so that  an implicit  deflator  can  be calculated.2' 
According  to this deflator,  the price  of orders,  relative  to the price  of non- 
residential  fixed investment,  rose continuously,  by over 18 percent,  from 
1952 to 1976. Another  problem  is that even after revisions  in the sta- 
tistics on unfilled  orders  and new orders,  the Bureau  of the Census  con- 
cluded that "a statistically  reliable  level [of unfilled  orders]  is still not 
known."25 
In spite  of these data  problems,  an analysis  of the distributed  lag from 
new orders  to shipments  is indispensable  to deriving  lag structures  for 
the equations  on capital-goods  orders  and investment  that are mutually 
consistent.  As described  by Joel Popkin,26  shipments  of capital goods 
(S) follow new orders (QE)  with a flexible  lag that is likely to depend 
on the ratio of unfilled  orders to shipments  (U/S).27  When that ratio 
24. The historical series are shown in Business Conditions  Digest (April 1977), 
pp. 96-97.  Contracts and orders for plant and equipment are the sum of  (1)  the 
value of commercial  and industrial  contracts, (2) the value of privately  owned public 
works and utilities contracts, and (3)  the value of manufacturers'  new orders, in 
nondefense capital-goods industries. The constant-dollar series on the third com- 
ponent is shown for the first time. Foreign orders and orders for export are included 
in both quarterly  series. 
25.  U.S.  Bureau of  the  Census, Current Industrial Reports, M3-1.6, "Manu- 
facturers'  Shipments,  Inventories, and Orders: 1958-1976 (Revised)" (GPO 1976), 
p. iv. The estimates of unfilled orders and new orders were revised by over 40 per- 
cent and by 5 percent,  respectively,  for 1975. 
26.  Joel Popkin, "The Relationship Between New  Orders and Shipments: An 
Analysis of the Machinery and Equipment  Industries,"  Survey of Current  Business, 
vol. 45 (March 1965), pp. 24-32. 
27. The market category, "capital goods industries,"  now  includes machinery 
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is relatively  high,  it takes  longer  to fill new orders  so that the influence  of 
recent orders on current  shipments  will be weaker and that of older 
orders  stronger.  However,  all new orders  not cancelled  are supposed  to 
lead to shipments  within a fixed number  of quarters.28  Popkin assumed 
that  all orders  placed  in any  one quarter  and  not shipped  in the next  quar- 
ter are shipped  in the quarter  thereafter,  so that the weight  of new orders 
on shipments  can shift only between two quarters.  However, since the 
1976 revisions  raised  the mean of U/S from  between 1 and 2 to 2.35, if 
the value of quarterly  shipments  is used in the denominator,  the lag of 
shipments  on orders  must  be four rather  than  two quarters.  Furthermore, 
the combination  of new orders,  unfilled  orders,  and  shipments  is available 
only in current  dollars and, back to 1958, only for the market  category 
"capital  goods-total"-that is, for defense  and nondefense  capital  goods 
combined.  To prevent  the ratio  of unfilled  orders  to shipments  from  being 
distorted  by inflation,  it was constructed  by dividing  the unfilled  orders  at 
the end of any quarter  by the nominal  shipments  in the succeeding  quar- 
ter on the theory  that unfilled  orders  reflect  the prices  realized  on subse- 
quent  shipments. 
The extension  of Popkin's  flexible  lag process  to four quarters  yields 
the  following  structural  specification: 
(3)  St  =  [bo +  bj(U/1S)t_]OEt_j  +  [b2  +  b3(U/S)t_2]OEt-2 
+  [b4  +  b5(U/S)t_3]OEt_3  +  [b6  +  b7(U/S)t_4]OEt-4. 
The constraint  that all orders  received  in period  t-4  will have  been filled 
by the end  of period  t provides  a substitute  for the last  term  in the  previous 
equation: 
(4)  [b6  +  b7(U/S)t_4]OEt4 = 
[a -  (b4 +  b5(U/S)t-4)  -  (b2 +  b3(U/S)t4)  -  (bo +  b,(U/S)t-4)]OEt-4. 
electrical machinery (except household appliances  and electronic components), and 
shipbuilding  and military tank vehicles, railroad equipment, communication equip- 
ment, aircraft and aircraft parts and ordnance. See "Manufacturers'  Shipments, In- 
ventories, and Orders: 1958-1976," p. xiii, for identification  of the defense and non- 
defense components  available  separately  since 1968. 
28.  New orders are derived by adding the change in unfilled orders between the 
current  and previous months to the estimate of shipments  for the current  month, so 
that new orders are reported net of cancellations. The lag structure  has some noise 
since cancellations  received  this period are applied  against  this period's  orders  regard- 
less of whether they refer to them or to orders received earlier. George  M. von  Furstenberg  369 
Unless there  are  unexplained  level differences  or data  inconsistencies  be- 
tween  the orders  and shipments  series,  the coefficient  a would  have to be 
unity since new orders are reported  net of cancellations.  Substituting 
and  combining  terms  then  yields  the estimating  equation: 
(5)  St = b,A(OE.  U/S)j_i +  (b, +  b3)A(OE.  U/S)-2 
+  (b, +  b3  +  b5)A(OE.  U/S)t-3  +  boAOEt-,  +  (bo  +  b2)AOEt-2 
+  (bo  +  b2  +  b4)A0Et_3  +  aOEt-4, 
where a subscript  of t -  i on differenced  variables  indicates  the change 
from  quarter  t -  (i  +  1  ) to quarter  t -  i. The variable  U/S is entered  in 
mean  deviants  by subtracting  2.35 from  the ratios  originally  constructed. 
With this modification  the expected size of bo, b2, and b4 is easily ex- 
plained:  all of these  coefficients  must  be positive.  Furthermore,  they  must 
sum  to less than  unity  if part  of new orders  results  in shipments  only with 
a four-quarter  lag so that  b,, the complement  of the sum  of bo,  b2,  and b4, 
is positive  also. 
The signs  of bl, b3,  b5,  and  b7  are  less easily  explained  because  a change 
in U/S redistributes  the weights  of orders  received  at different  times in 
current  shipments.  Clearly,  the higher U/S, the less recent orders  will 
matter.  Hence b, must  be negative  and  b7  positive.  The coefficients  b3  and 
b5  both apply  to terms  around  the middle  of the lag distribution.  How a 
rise in U/S affects  their  weight  cannot  be determined  a priori,  since there 
is both redistribution  "in"  from the short side of the lag domain  and re- 
distribution  "out"  from  the far side as weights  shift  contiguously.  Though 
matters  are somewhat  complicated  through  the multiplication  of U/S by 
OE, the sum  of b1,  b3,  b5,  and  b7  must  be zero under  stationary  conditions 
if the  redistribution  among  periods  remains  confined  to four  quarters. 
Estimation  of equation  5 yielded the following  results (in which the 
numbers  in parentheses  are  t statistics): 
(5a)  St  =-0.  525A(OE. U/S)t_l  -  3013A(OE  U/S)t_2 
(-8.55)  (-  4.54) 
-0.  181A(OE.  U/S)t_3  +  0.201AOEt-,  +  0.643AOEt-2 
(-3.40)  (4.34)  (11.20) 
+  0. 926AOEt-3  +  1. OOOOEt.4; 
(24.24)  (306.95) 
A2  =  0.995;  Durbin-Watson  = 1.64. 370  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
These regression  results conform to  expectations  in  every detail, 
and do not display  significant  serial correlation  in the error  terms.  The 
structural  coefficients  obtained  from the regression  and shown  below in- 
dicate  that  when U/S is at its mean,  20 percent  of the new orders  received 
last quarter  are  filled  this quarter,  as are  44 percent  of the orders  received 
two quarters  ago, 28 percent  of those  received  three  quarters  ago, and  7 to 
8 percent  of those received  four quarters  ago. However,  if U/S is above 
the mean,  the weight  on current  shipments  of the most recent  orders,  re- 
ceived  last quarter,  is reduced  in favor  of all the more  distant  quarters,  as 
only  b, is found  to be negative.29 
Structural  coefficients 
bo  0.201  b5 0.120 
b1 -0.525  be 0.074 
b2  0.442  b7 0.181 
b3  0.224  a  1.000 
b4  0.283 
What  do these results  say about  how the lags in investment  equations 
must  relate  to the length  of lags in the orders  equations?  The coefficients 
with even-numbered  subscripts,  bo  through  b6, sum to unity  by assump- 
tion. If this assumption  is false because the maximum  length of lags is 
either significantly  shorter  or longer than four quarters,  the magnitude 
assigned  to b, would  either  be very  small  or negative,  or implausibly  large. 
Neither  is the case since  all but 7 to 8 percent  of the new orders  for equip- 
ment  were  estimated  to result  in shipments  within  three  quarters  after  the 
quarter  in which  the orders  were placed. It seems entirely  reasonable  to 
assign  that  remainder  to the fourth  quarter.  Furthermore,  the coefficient  a 
was estimated  to be unity (0.9997).  It would have been less than unity 
if new orders  lead to shipments  with longer  lags than  four quarters  since 
the values for both nominal  orders and shipment  are rising over time; 
and it would have been greater  than unity in the opposite  case.30  Hence 
the  initial  specification  has  been  vindicated  in every  respect.  Whatever  lags 
29.  The structural coefficients are obtained from the regression coefficients of 
text equation 5a, using the conditions bo +  b2 +  b4 +  b6 =  1 and b1 +  b3 +  b5 +  b7 
=0. 
30. Conversely,  if the "true"  lag is distributed  over four quarters  but the specifica- 
tion allowed for three (five)  quarters, a should be less (greater) than unity. This 
expectation  was confirmed  by the data since the estimated  value of a was 0.997 with 
three quarters  and 1.004 with five quarters. George  M. von Furstenberg  371 
are  found  to apply  to explanatory  variables  in the orders  equations  must 
be lengthened  by four  quarters  in the investment  equations  to account  for 
the distributed  lag from  new  orders  to shipments. 
Since  this  finding  applies  strictly  only to equipment,  longer  lags cannot 
be ruled  out when  the rate  of total nonresidential  investment,  rather  than 
of equipment  alone, is analyzed,  as Ciccolo has done. It is obvious  that 
new plant construction  can take several  years, particularly  in the utility 
sector. Since utility investment  is also rather  special in other respects, 
the attempt  to deduce  the lag structure  of investment  determinants  from 
the behavior  of orders  clearly  does not fit every  sector  or every  type of in- 
vestment.  However,  it may fit the part  that makes  for the greatest  varia- 
tions in the gross nonresidential  investment  rate-that  is, equipment  in- 
vestment.  The answer  to whether  it does lies in the coherence  of the 
regression  results on the rates of new orders and investment  with and 
without  the use of q reported  in the remainder  of this paper.  But, first, 
how does q function  in simple  regressions  and how does it interact  with 
other variables  in multiple regressions  with adjustment  for first-order 
autocorrelation  of the error  terms? 
The Information  Content  of q 
As an extreme  position,  it could  be argued  that q embodies  all the in- 
formation  relevant  to corporate  orders  for capital  goods and investment 
decisions.  Thus, one of Ciccolo's  specifications  reflects  the view that in- 
vestment  rates can be explained  solely by q and the inverse  of the real 
stock  of gross  fixed  capital  with  adjustment  for first-order  autocorrelation 
of the residuals.3'  Since the inverse  of the capital stock with a negative 
coefficient  accounts  merely  for the persistent  updrift  in the ratio of gross 
fixed  investment  to the gross capital  stock that is due to the growing  im- 
portance  of equipment  in total capital compared  to longer-lived  struc- 
31. See Ciccolo, "Four  Essays,"  pp. 40-42, equation I, also shown by Barry Bos- 
worth, "The Stock Market and the Economy," BPEA, 2:1975, p. 287. Lags actually 
reported in the literature on direct tests of q in investment equations range from 
eight to thirteen quarters. For the former, see Ciccolo. The latter is included in a 
comparison of  models appearing in Robert F.  Engle and Duncan K. Foley,  "An 
Asset Price Model of Aggregate Investment,"  International  Economic Review, vol. 
16 (October 1975), pp. 642-43. 372  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
tures,  q is the only variable  that  can explain  short-term  fluctuations  in the 
investment  rate in such equations.  The assumption  is that if q is below 
equilibrium  good stewardship  will make  corporate  managers  allocate  less 
after-tax  earnings  and  external  funds  to fixed  investment:  since  the oppor- 
tunity  cost of a dollar so invested  is higher  than the market  value of a 
dollar's  worth  of new producers'  durables  installed  in the firm,  stockhold- 
ers  would  gain  if managers  curtailed  fixed  investments  as long as q remains 
low. 
An opposing  view could start  out simply  by suggesting  that stockhold- 
ers  and  the evaluations  on Wall Street  may not rule supreme  and  that  the 
planning  horizons,  incentives,  and  perceptions  of corporate  managers  and 
financial  investors  in the corporation  need not coincide.  This view can be 
held  without  asserting  an inherent  difference  in the interests  of managers 
and  investors.  Managers  acting  in what  they perceive  to be the best long- 
run  interests  of shareholders  and the corporation  may still not pay much 
attention  to current  and past average  levels of q, especially  if they are 
convinced  that the marginal  q exceeds the average  q so that increasing 
some types of fixed investment  raises the expected  level of q. Whether 
q can go it alone or whether other factors matter also-or,  indeed, 
whether  some of these other factors explain  much of the variation  in q 
and,  moreover,  influence  the investment  rate  beyond  the extent  that they 
influence  q in the first  place-thus  remains  an empirical  question. 
As part  of the answer  to these questions,  the results  of the preliminary 
investigations  reported  in table 2 show that using only q and a capital- 
stock-mix  variable  equal  to the ratio  of the real gross  stock of equipment 
to that  of plant  and equipment,  GE/GPE,  indeed  explains  a large  part  of 
the variance  in the annualized  orders  and investment  rates.32  The ratio 
GE/GPE,  which  rises  from 0.40 in 1952 to 0.52 in 1976 with a mean  of 
0.4672, is used without  lags in lieu of Ciccolo's inverse of the capital 
stock, and its expected  coefficient  is positive. The expected  size of the 
coefficient  of GE/GPE  is between 6 and 7 in the investment  equations 
32. So far, only annual data are available  from the Bureau  of Economic Analysis 
for nonfinancial corporations. The constant-dollar  investment of nonfinancial cor- 
porations was distributed  quarterly by assuming that their share of the total non- 
residential  investment  reported  quarterly  by BEA was constant throughout  the year. 
Quarterly  data on "contracts  and orders for plant and equipment in 1972 dollars" 
are provided as series 20 in the Business Conditions Digest, and the denominator 
used to construct  the orders rate was the same as that used for investment. 44  >  :  >o  aO  00  C  W>  00 M "o  oo  tn c)  en  0  2 
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and around  10 in the orders  equations  since the mean  of the annualized 
orders  rate is 11.0 percent  compared  with a mean of 7.5 percent  for the 
investment  rate.33  In equations  2.1 and 2.5 of table 2, I have used this 
variable  and a second-degree  Almon lag on q whose coefficients  are con- 
strained  to zero for lead periods  and  for lags of more  than  three  quarters 
in the orders  equation,  and for lags of less than one and  more  than  seven 
quarters  in the investment  equation  to reflect  the application  of the esti- 
mated  lag from orders  to shipments;  the R2 estimated  with AOLS is 88 
percent  and  96 percent,  respectively.  However,  at least  in the orders  equa- 
tion, equal  or better  results  can be obtained  when  the capacity  utilization 
rate  is substituted  for q. Thus,  the results  of monocausal  regressions  with 
q can easily be matched  by equally  simple  regressions  with CU. In fact, 
CU worked  best without  lags in the orders  equation  and  with lags of one 
to four quarters  in the investment  equation,  and serial  correlation  was a 
smaller  problem  than  in the equation  with  q. 
Serial  correlation  of the error  term is most debilitating  in the orders 
equation  with q and the capital-mix  variable  alone. To see this, compare 
the variance  of the presumably  random  error  term  (8)  estimated  from the 
AOLS  regressions,  to the  mean-square  of the difference,  u, between  the ac- 
tual  value  of the dependent  variable,  y, and  its value  estimated  with all co- 
efficients  other  than  p found  in the  AOLS  regression,  EAiX  . The  term  u is 
defined  by the first-order  Markov  process,  Ut  =  pUt-i  +  et, which  imme- 
diately  shows  that the expected  value  of u is zero  if the expected  value  of 8 
is zero,  since  E(u) =  E(8) /(1-).  Hence  the expected  population  value  of 
the mean square  of u is the variance  o-2  if the number  of observations  is 
large. Furthermore.  defining R.,1  -  (cr  )  . and R  =  1  -  (f  /y.,),  and 
33. The average age of the gross stock of equipment  in 1972 dollars, estimated  as 
around seven years since 1960, is 40 to 50 percent of the average age of structures. 
In a stationary setting one could infer from this that equipment  is replaced at most 
21/2 times as often as structures.  A  0.01 rise in GE/GPE  (from a level of 0.47) 
would then raise the discard  rate by 0.88 percent of itself, or by 0.035 from its mean 
of 3.94 (percent of the real gross stock of nonresidential  fixed capital of nonfinancial 
corporations). In the absence of growth, the coefficient  on GE/GPE would thus be 
expected to be 3.5. However, in a growing economy, differences  in the average age 
of different types of capital understate  the differences  in their turnover rates. Thus, 
the annual discard rates estimated from BEA data increased from 3.52 in 1952 to 
4.28 in 1976, or by almost twice as much as the 0.42 (3.5 X 0.12) rise expected  under 
stationary conditions. Thus, the coefficient  on GE/GPE should be between 6 and 7. 
Direct use of the discard rates (with quarterly  interpolation) in lieu of the capital- 
mix variable in the investment equations  proved unrewarding. George  M. von Furstenberg  375 
using  -  =  c4/(1  p2), Green and Watson34  have shown that the expected 
asymptotic  relation  of R2, R2, and  p2 iS 
(6)  R2 =  (R2 -  p2)/(I  -  p2)  >  0, p <  1. 
Though the estimated value of  2  will normally fal  below the expected 
value given  by equation  6, very large differences  between  the two coeffi- 
cients of determination  indicate  inconsistent  estimation,  at least in the 
logical  sense.35 
Such  large  differences  arise  in equation  2.1, where  UR  is found  to be nega- 
tive  for the orders  rate.  This  implies  that  the coefficients  of q found  in that 
equation  point  the wrong  way  when  given  a ceteris  paribus  interpretation. 
Since,  instead  of explaining  the investment  and orders  rates  directly,  varia- 
tions in q merely  generate  estimates  with  highly  autocorrelated  error  terms 
explained  by p, nothing  is learned  about  how q might  function  outside  this 
error  band. This would inhibit out-of-sample  forecasting  applications  if 
they  were  made  for  more  than  a few quarters  ahead  even  if future  levels  of q 
were  known  with certainty.36 
Hence  one must  either  abandon  the  AOLS  method  of estimation  or add 
those  omitted  variables  that  may  account  for inconsistency  to simple  AOLS 
34. R.  Jeffery Green and Harry S.  Watson, "What Do  Autoregressive Least 
Squares Results in  Financial Analysis Really  Mean?" (Indiana University, n.d.; 
processed). 
35.  In an equation of the form ys =  E  fixis  +  put-,  +  et,  A2  must be nonnegative  if 
the 8i are true population estimates or known constants.  When  p2 approaches  R2, R2 
approaches zero in the Green-Watson  formula, and almost the entire explanatory 
power of AOLS regressions  derives  from the explanation  of the variance  of ut through 
the first-order  Markov process. If the Green-Watson  formula is very far from being 
satisfied  in a sample  there  is a presumption  of specification  error  due to the omission of 
relevant variables,  although significance  levels of the difference  between the expected 
Ru and the estimated P2 have not yet been derived. In equation 2.5 in table 2, the 
expected value of R2 is 0.81, compared  with the estimated  sample value of 0.57. The 
difference  between  the expected  and estimated  values of R2 is much greater  if Ciccolo's 
equation is replicated directly; R2 is  then again negative (-2.35)  even though the 
estimated R2 (0.96) exceeds the estimated  value of p2  (0.90).  While the sample mean, 
as opposed to the expected  value, of ut-yt  -  E  ixit need not be precisely  zero (this 
point is owed to Tobin), so that the estimated R2 would normally fall below the ex- 
pected R2, this fact alone does not account for the enormous  deficit (-2.95)  between 
these two coefficients  found in this case. With u adjusted to shift R from 0.93 to 0, 
this alternative  Al is still negative  (-1.01). 
36. A short-term  forecasting application  is reported in James Tobin, "Monetary 
Policy in  1974 and Beyond," BPEA, 1:1974, p. 225. The q ratio was kept at its 
1973:4 actual level throughout  the forecast period of the following year. 376  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
estimates  with  q. The  latter  approach  is reflected  in equations  2.3 and  2.7 of 
table  2, which  show  that  including  both CU and  q restores  R2  to the more 
respectable  size of 0.70, compared  with 0.84 expected  from the Green- 
Watson  formula.  However,  the results  also suggest  that q is functionally 
related  to CU  so that  the  overall  explanatory  power  improves  very  little  and 
the size  and  significance  of the  regression  coefficients  suffer  when  q is added 
to the run with CU.37 
To obtain estimates  that separate  the effects of all other "indepen- 
dent"  variables  without  going  through  q, more  is therefore  required  than 
the mere  addition  of explanatory  variables  to equations  with  q. Rather,  all 
the nonfinancial  factors  that were previously  discussed  as candidates  for 
entry into the orders and investment  equations  must be examined  for 
their  influence  on q. If they are significant  in explaining  variations  in q, 
the  estimates  can  then  be used  to adjust  q to make  the  residual  variations  in 
it independent  of the other explanatory  variables  in the regression  and 
vice versa.  Were  it not for the presence  of variables  with Almon  lags and 
for the fact that the tax variables  are scaled differently  in the equations 
for q from the orders and investment  equations,  this procedure  would 
bring  no new information  to the regression  and  would  not change  the size 
or significance  of the coefficient  of q or the size of R2.  Even  then,  however, 
it would change both the size and significance  of the other regression 
coefficients  compared  with what  they were  in equations  2.3 and 2.7. Ad- 
justing  q thus allows a direct  reading  from the regression  results  of what 
these  other  variables  are  doing  when  their  influence  is not partly  conveyed 
through  q. Indeed, comparing  equations  2.3 and 2.4 shows that merely 
adjusting  or standardizing  q for the influence  of CU yields  some  marginal 
improvements  in the significance  of CU without  altering  the significance 
of q. However,  the adjustments  must  be carried  further. 
DECODING  q 
Barry  Bosworth  has written  that  "the  securities-valuation  model  leaves 
the basic  determinants  of investment  in a black  box."38  While  the use of q 
"offers  the advantage  of not requiring  the explicit measurement  of the 
37. The zero-order correlation  coefficient  between CU and q is 0.40. 
38. Bosworth, "Stock  Market and the Economy,"  p. 286. George  M. von Furstenberg  377 
effect of taxes, expected  output,  and expected  prices  needed in the neo- 
classical  version,"39  no one has shown  empirically  how movements  of q in 
the aggregate  can be explained  for the nonfinancial  corporate  sector  as a 
whole.40  Unless  one knows  with some precision  the factors  influencing  q, 
there is no way to judge how changes  in q should affect capital-goods 
orders  and  investment  and how such changes  should  enter  the estimating 
equations.  Furthermore,  if q cannot  readily  be forecast,  investment  equa- 
tions  containing  q would  be of little benefit  to forecasters  unless  the effect 
of q on orders  and  investment  involves  very  long  lags. 
This defect could conceivably  be remedied  if q, while exogenous, 
could at least be linked  to policy instruments  whose levels must already 
be assumed  for any forecast.  Brainard  and Tobin have pointed in this 
direction,  arguing  that  "the  valuation  of investment  goods relative  to their 
cost  is the prime  indicator  and  proper  target  of monetary  policy, [because] 
nothing  else, whether  it is the quantity  of 'money'  or some  financial  inter- 
est rate, can be more than an imperfect  and derivative  indicator  of the 
effective  thrust of monetary  events and policies."'41  But in that case a 
workable  link between monetary-policy  instruments  and q would have 
to be established  before q could serve as a target.  As Tobin himself  has 
emphasized,  forging  such a link will not be easy since not only monetary 
policy,  but  also  other  exogenous  events  can  cause  q to change.42  I hypothe- 
size that the explicit  and  implicit  (inflation-related)  tax-change  variables 
that  were  previously  found  to have a powerful  effect  on the after-tax  rate 
of return  on capital  employed  by nonfinancial  corporations  may repre- 
sent  such  events  though  not all of them  are  exogenous.  Furthermore,  even 
though I remain convinced  that the quarterly  capacity-utilization  rate 
should  affect  the expected  profitability  of only the most short-lived  invest- 
ments,  the nation's  shareholders  and  bondholders  may  not necessarily  act 
as if they shared  that viewpoint.  The simple-minded  regression  results 
reported  above already  suggested  that capacity  utilization  and q interact. 
39.  Ibid., p. 285. 
40.  For a related critique  see Herschel I. Grossman,  "Tobin  on Macroeconomics: 
A Review Article,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 83 (August 1975), pp. 837-38. 
For a brief discussion of the history of q see also Donald D. Hester, "Contributions 
and Growth in Tobin's Economic Essays: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic 
Literature,  vol. 15 (June 1977), pp. 489-91. 
41.  Brainard  and Tobin, "Pitfalls in Financial Model Building,"  p. 104. 
42.  See Tobin, "General  Equilibrium  Approach  to Monetary  Theory,"  p. 29. 378  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
RESULTS 
Regressing  q on the same  variables  used  in the  ATR equations  allows  a 
test of whether  the determinants  of the after-tax  rate  of return  on capital 
also influence  the market  value  of nonfinancial  corporations  relative  to the 
replacement  cost of their assets. However, since the influence  on q of 
temporary  changes  in the tax rate (RCT) and the corresponding  perma- 
nent changes (RCP), and of permanent  changes  in the investment  tax 
credit (ICP)  and in depreciation  allowances (DCP)  may differ, the 
components  of explicit  tax changes  must  be run  separately.  All tax-related 
variables  with the exception of the debt-asset ratio (D/A)  are here 
divided  by the replacement  cost of "total  net assets"  shown  in column  3 
of table 1, and expressed  in percent.  The dummy  variable  for the brief 
suspension  of the investment-tax  credit starting  in October  1966, IC66, 
which  was already  explained,  is also included  in the regressions  reported 
in table 3. Time trends  proved  to be completely  insignificant,  suggesting 
that q has not been dropping  for reasons that can be explained  only 
through  the makeshift  of "time." 
It turns  out that  several  of the permanent  explicit  tax-change  variables, 
and some of the inflation-related  implicit ones, are significant  in the 
AOLS equations  reported  in table 3. The variables  RCT and DCP (not 
shown) never come close to being significant,  indicating  that temporary 
rate changes and permanent  depreciation  changes,  which will later be 
found to have no significant  effect on orders  and investment,  do not in- 
fluence  q either.  RCP, on the other  hand,  has a strong  effect  on q such  that 
a $2 billion permanent  cut in annual corporation  income taxes, which 
would  lower  RCP by 0.1 in 1976, would raise  q by 0.03, or by 4 percent 
of its sample  mean  of 0.82 during  the first  quarter  for which  the cut is in 
effect.  A tax reduction  via the investment  tax credit  has less impact  and is 
not always statistically  significant.  An integral  specification  of the ex- 
pected  effect  of permanent  tax changes  on q yielded  similar  results.43 
43.  Since permanent tax changes produce a positive or negative rent until the 
capital stock has been reequilibrated,  these rent components,  equal to the cumulative 
amount of the expected change in tax liabilities with the phaseout factors explained 
in the attached appendix,  were summed to the present ignoring discounting.  If these 
rents are instantly  capitalized,  q should move in line with this integral  which declines 
more steeply with the passage of time after a change in taxes than the phased-out  tax 
change variables in the integrand used in table 3. However, empirically there was 
little to choose from since the results on RCP and ICP were no more reliable with 
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Table  3. Alternative  Estimates  of the Determinants  of q for Nonfinancial  Corporations, 
Quarterly,  1952:1-1976:4$ 
Equation 
Independent  variable  and 
regression  statistic  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.813  1.051  0.741  0.847 
(6.49)  (26.10)  (6.02)  (11.-69) 
CU  0.558  0.557  0.538  0.321 
(2.71)  (2.77)  (2.55)  (1.61) 
lC66  0.041  0.043  0.039 
(1.68)  (1.71)  (1.63) 
ICCA  0.188  0.197  0.178 
(4.49)  (5.02)  (4.14) 
IVA  0.039  0.031  0.040  ... 
(2.28)  (1.95)  (2.36) 
RCP  -0.290  -0.394  -0.256 
(-2.91)  (-4.93)  (-2.33) 
ICP  -0.136  -0.277  ...  ... 
(-0.86)  (-2.02) 
DIA  1.058  ...  1.356  ... 
(1.99)  (2.58) 
Regressiona  statistic 
P  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.91 
Standard  error  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Durbin-Watson  1.86  1.81  1.89  1.76 
p  0.69  0.63  0.73  0.94 
Ae  0.85  0.86  0.83  0.03 
Standard  error  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.15 
Durbin-Watson  0.61  0.72  0.54  0.09 
Sources: CU, which is entered minus its mean of 0,833, is from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; IVA is from U.S.  Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts 
of the United States, 1929-74: Statistical Tables  (GPO, 1977), table 1.15, and Survey of Current  Business, 
various issues; D/A  is column  5 of  table 1 divided by columnn  3 of table 1; IC66, a dummy variable, is 
constructed as described in text note 23; ICCA was derived by the author as described in text note  16; 
RCP and ICP were estimated by the author and are available from him in a longer version of the appendix; 
and q is from table 1, column 9, divided by (1  -  k). The variables are as defined in the text. ICCA, IVA, 
RCP, and ICP are divided by total net assets from table 1, column 3, and expressed  in percentage  terms. 
a.  The method of estimation used in all regressions is ordinary least squares with a correction for first- 
order autocorrelation. The nurmbers  in parentheses  are t statistics. 
The inflation-tax  variables,  IVA, ICCA, and D/A,  are also generally 
statistically  significant  and so are CU and,  by a more  lenient  standard  of 
statistical  significance,  IC66. In particular,  a -$14  billion "rise"  in the 
inflation-induced  part  of the CCA, similar  to the one that occurred  from 
1974 to 1976, which  would "raise"  the negative  ICCA by -0.7,  is esti- 380  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
mated  to reduce  q by 15 percent  of its mean.  This makes  implicit  tax in- 
creases  a much  more  powerful  influence  on q than  explicit  tax cuts  during 
this period,  although  not all of the negative  effect of inflation  need have 
been due to fiscal factors.44  Simultaneous  cyclical factors also have a 
strong  effect  in that a 10 percent  rise in CU from its mean of 0.833 in- 
creases  q by 5 to 6 percent.  Lagging  CU diluted  this effect.  Furthermore, 
autocorrelation  of the error  terms  is not overwhelming,  and the Green- 
Watson formula (equation 6)  is very nearly satisfied  in the first three 
equations,  indicating  consistent  estimation.  The RI is only a few percent 
below the R2 of around  0.92 found in those AOLS equations.  The fit is 
better than average  in the last year of the estimation  period and q is 
slightly above its predicted  value, indicating  that the stock and bond 
markets  were  not inexplicably  low in 1976. 
Assuming  that monetary  and fiscal policy operated  in splendid  isola- 
tion  from  each  other  and  that  none of the explanatory  variables  picked  up 
the effects  of omitted  variables,  it could be argued  that little is left if q 
is to reflect  monetary  policy effects,  rather  than  fiscal effects  and current 
cyclical conditions.  Such effects would then have to be hidden in the 
remaining  10 or 15 percent  of its total variance  (depending  on whether 
the first-order  serial-correlation  process  can somehow  be attributed  to the 
conduct of monetary  policy45)  along with the random-error  term account- 
ing for "the  numerous  sharp  fluctuations  in stock  prices  that  appear  retro- 
spectively  to be unwarranted."46  Thus, it is not entirely  obvious at this 
stage  that  q can bring  a significant  amount  of new information  to bear on 
44.  A  rise in the rate of  inflation that raises the absolute value of ICCA this 
period will continue to do so over an entire replacement cycle even if the added 
inflation lasts only one year. Assuming that the discounted cumulative effects are 
ten times as large as the first-year  rise in taxes due to increased underdepreciation 
and that the effective tax rate is 40 percent, additional  taxes of $56 billion, or 3 per- 
cent of "total net assets" in the denominator  of q and ICCA, are generated in the 
case discussed.  If inflation  is expected to continue at the higher rate beyond one year, 
the expected effect on q would be several times larger. 
45.  Describing the wealth effects of the stock market on consumption, Franco 
Modigliani has suggested that incorporating  such effects leads to a speed-up of the 
measured response of money GNP to changes in the supply of money. If this speed- 
up applied  analogously  to investment,  the size of the autocorrelation  coefficient  could 
decline with the introduction  of q into equations for orders and investment. How- 
ever, the opposite was found. See Franco Modigliani, "Discussion,"  American Eco- 
nomic Review, vol. 62 (May 1972), p. 230. 
46.  Irwin Friend, "The Economic Consequences  of the Stock Market,"  American 
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capital-goods  orders  and investment.  However,  should  it do so, q would 
be quite  useful  in forecasting  investment  rates  since  q itself  can  be forecast 
along with other  variables,  even after  the effect  of the lagged  error  term 
(ut-l) has  died  down. 
Results  for Capital-Goods  Orders  and Investment 
This analysis  of the interdependence  of q and other explanatory  vari- 
ables  sets  the stage  for specifying  three  complete  equations  for orders  and 
investment  rates.  The first  regression  for each contains  all variables  other 
than  RCT, DCP, and D/A,47  and it omits q. The variable  q, unadjusted 
except  for the division  by (1 -  k) explained  above,  is added  in the second 
equations.  Using the regression  coefficients  reported  in equation  3.2 of 
table  3, q is then adjusted  and  substituted  for the unadjusted  q in the third 
equation  reported  in each section  of table 4. This should  help determine 
whether q brings additional  information  to bear on the capital-goods 
orders  and investment  process  after  it has been stripped  of the influence 
of all the other explanatory  variables  that have a statistically  significant 
effect  on it. The  regression  results  are  reported  in table  4. 
Apart  from  the Almon  lags and  other  differences  in the construction  of 
transformed  inputs,  the linear  regression  coefficients  found  in this exercise 
would be as follows: (1)  The coefficients  and significance  levels of all 
variables  (except for the intercept) reported  for equation  4.1  (4.4)  in 
table 4 would be the same as those for equation  4.3 (4.6).  (2)  The re- 
gression  coefficient  and significance  level of q would  be the same  in equa- 
tions 4.2 (4.5)  and 4.3 (4.6)  but the coefficients  of all other variables 
used to adjust  q would change both in size and significance.  (3)  The 
AOLS coefficient  of determination,  R2, and all other summary  statistics 
would  be identical  in equations  4.2 (4.5) and  4.3 (4.6). 
47.  None of these variables seemed to matter much in either the investment or 
the orders equation. RCT and DIA  were lagged once in the latter while DCP was 
lagged like the other permanent tax-change variables, RCP and ICP. Specifically, 
the coefficient on RCT was minute and statistically insignificant,  the coefficient on 
DCP was generally negative as expected but never significant,  and the coefficient  on 
DIA  was positive and close to significant  only at the expense of the capital-stock- 
mix variable which also contains a persistent  uptrend.  Of the two, GE/GPE seemed 
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Table  4. Final Regression  Results  for the Real Values  of the Rate of Contracts  and 
Orders  and  the Rate of Investment  of Nonfinancial  Corporations,  Alternative 
Specifications,  Quarterly,  1952:1-1976  :4a 
Rate of contracts  and orders  Rate of investment 
Independent  variable  With  With 
and regression  Without  q  With  q  adjusted  qb  Without  q  With  q  adjusted  qb 
statistic  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.6 
Independent  variable 
Constant  11.697  4.236  7.888  7.991  3.097  2.818 
(23.87)  (1.63)  (2.75)  (20.70)  (1.75)  (1.33) 
CU,  19.984  15.071  18.729  9.783  5.991  7.486 
(6.94)  (4.73)  (6.26)  (4.88)  (2.58)  (3.51) 
GEIGPE  29.588  27.649  27.829  16.732  16.814  15.654 
(5.23)  (4.54)  (4.66)  (3.41)  (3.30)  (2.97) 
IC660  0.429  0.312  0.365  0.522  0.447  0.460 
(1.30)  (0.99)  (1.11)  (1.72)  (1.54)  (1.57) 
ICCAd  0.785  -0.527  0.793  0.556  -0.168  0.669 
(1.76)  (-0.82)  (1.72)  (1.72)  (-0.40)  (1.99) 
IVAC  -0.429  -0.406  -0.417  0.352  0.319  0.330 
(-2.16)  (-2.06)  (-2.08)  (2.62)  (2.43)  (2.48) 
RCPe  0.459  3.785  0.516  -2.236  -0.611  -2.811 
(0.40)  (2.13)  (0.42)  (-1.85)  (-0.45)  (-2.23) 
ICPe  1.909  2.761  1.655  0.007  0.507  -0.513 
(1.15)  (1.52)  (0.96)  (0.01)  (0.41)  (-0.41) 
qo  . . .  7.104  3.551  ...  4.726  4.825 
(2.92)  (1.35)  (2.83)  (2.50) 
Regression  statistic 
Ra2  0.89  0.90  0.89  0.95  0.96  0.96 
Standard  error  0.53  0.51  0.53  0.18  0.17  0.17 
Durbin-Watson  1.96  2.09  2.01  1.50  1.65  1.63 
p  0.54  0.61  0.57  0.85  0.88  0.88 
R2  0.85  0.84  0.84  0.76  0.67  0.64 
Standard  error  0.64  0.65  0.65  0.41  0.49  0.50 
Durbin-Watson  0.90  0.77  0.85  0.21  0.14  0.13 
Sources: Same as table 2 or 3 above. ICCA, IVA, RCP, and ICP are here divided by the gross stock of 
plant and equipment of nonfinancial corporations and expressed in percentage terms. CU and GEIGPE 
are entered minus their respective  means of 0.833 and 0.4672. 
a.  The dependent variables are expressed as a percent of the real gross capital stock of plant and equip- 
ment of  nonfinancial corporations. The method of  estimation used in all regressions is  ordinary least 
squares with a correction for first-order  autocorrelation. The numbers in parentheses  are t statistics. 
b.  Adjusted q is defined as q  -  0.56CU  -  0.04IC66 - 0.20ICCA  -  0.03IVA +  0.39RCP +  0.281CP. 
See table 3 above, equation 3.2. 
c.  The sum of the lag coefficients is reported in the investment equations for CU, IC66, and IVA. See 
table 2 above, note c, for a description of the lag structure. 
d.  In the investment  equations ICCA was constructed  as a weighted  average  of its four most recent values, 
using as weights the fixed coefficients  bo, b,, b4, and b6,  reported  in the text. 
e.  In all equations, the sum of the lag coefficients is reported for q, RCP, and ICP. See table 2 above, 
note d, for a description of the lag structure. George  M. von Furstenberg  383 
Since the lag structure  adopted  in the investment  equation  is derived 
from that obtained  in the orders  equation  using the lag from orders  to 
shipments  analyzed  above,  the rationales  for the latter  must  be explained. 
As already  reported,  CU worked  best without  lags in that  equation.  Since 
CU is a decision  variable  which is planned  and adjusted  by nonfinancial 
corporations  along  with  orders  in the light  of their  inventory  position  and 
sales expectations,  there  is no cogent reason  for assuming  that corpora- 
tions  hark  back  to earlier  CUs in placing  orders.  Efforts  to introduce  vari- 
ables  reflecting  disappointed  sales  expectations  and  relative-price  changes 
directly  into the orders and investment  equations  proved unsuccessful. 
Rather, both capacity utilization and orders may well be determined 
simultaneously,  so that whatever  affects  the utilization  rate also affects 
orders  with  about  the same  lag. 
However,  it takes  more time to react  to changes  in q, which are often 
due  to factors  external  to individual  corporations;  and  it also takes  longer 
to respond  to explicit permanent  tax changes,  which generally  are de- 
signed  to avoid  economic  disruptions.  Hence  these  variables  were  entered 
with lags constrained  to zero for lead periods and for lags in excess of 
three quarters  in the orders equation  on the theory that four quarters 
should  provide  adequate  time  to react. 
The choice of lag on the inventory  valuation  adjustment  depends  to 
some extent  on what  one is trying  to explain.  The variable  IVA is scaled 
by the nominal  value of the gross stock of plant and equipment  of non- 
financial  corporations,  as are  other  tax-related  variables  because  all are  in 
nominal  dollars.  If an increase  in prices  and in the absolute  value of this 
IVA coincides  with a scramble  to beat price increases  before  they reach 
the finished-goods  stage,  IVA should  be entered  without  lags  in the orders 
equation.  On the other  hand,  longer  lags would be in order  if IVA is to 
reflect  the influence  of tax factors  and of the profit  squeeze  that appears 
to result  from inflation  (as the results  on the after-tax  rate of return  re- 
ported  in the appendix  suggest). The expected  sign of the coefficient  on 
IVA (itself signed  as in the national  income  accounts)  would  then  change 
from negative  to positive.  After some experimentation  I decided  to use 
no lag  on IVA in the orders  equations. 
The same choice was made  for 1C66,  GE/GPE,  and ICCA, although 
the last clearly  reflects  the cumulative  and not just the short-term  effects 
of inflation  on ATR. However,  because  the negative  ICCA moves  gradu- 
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rising,48  there  would be no point in estimating  a distributed  lag for this 
variable.  This applies  also to the investment  equations  in which ICCA 
was constructed  as a weighted  average  of its four most  recent  past  values, 
using  the fixed  coefficients,  b0, b2,  b4,  and  b6,  reported  above,  as weights.49 
The variable  GE/GPE moves up throughout  the data period, but at a 
snail's  pace,  so that  variable  needs  no distributed  lags either.50 
Second-degree  Almon  lag polynominals  were,  however,  used  for all the 
other variables  in the investment  equations  after lags had been length- 
ened just as the orders-to-shipments  relation prescribed.  All variables 
used in the orders  equation  were first lagged one additional  quarter  to 
preclude  any simultaneous  effect of new orders  on shipments,  and the 
maximum  length  of lags was then extended  by three quarters,  for a total 
of four  quarters. 
Comparing  the results  for orders  and  investment  rates  in table  4 shows 
that the sign patterns  are consistent  for q and for the first  four variables, 
CU, GE/GPE,  IC66, and ICCA. The mean of the annualized  contracts 
and orders  rate of 11.0 percent  exceeds  the 7.5 percent  mean  for the in- 
vestment  rate  because  all capital-goods  orders,  and  not just those placed 
by nonfinancial  corporations,  are included  in the numerator  of the orders 
rate.  For this reason,  the absolute  values  of the regression  coefficients  are 
generally  greater  in the orders  equation,  but  their  significance  is compara- 
ble to those  found  in the  corresponding  investment  equations. 
Sign conflicts arise in connection  with the variables  RCP and ICP. 
Insignificant  "wrong"  or positively  signed  coefficients  on these variables 
are damaging  in the orders equations  even though total contracts  and 
orders  for plant and equipment  may be less affected  by permanent  tax 
changes  in the corporate  sector  than  corporate  contracts  and  orders  alone. 
Corporate-tax  changes  may cause some investment  activity  to shift be- 
tween  the corporate  and  the noncorporate  sectors  in which  nonresidential 
capital  is employed.  The sign conflict  in IVA is more troublesome.  The 
48.  ICCA "declined"  from -1.2  percent of the gross stock of plant and equip- 
ment of nonfinancial  corporations  in the mid-fifties  to about -0.6  percent  in 1964-65 
as the effects of wartime inflation  waned. It then "climbed"  to -2.0  percent in 1976, 
reflecting  a new wave of inflation. 
49.  An attempt to estimate flexible coefficients  of the form (bi + bjU/S)  on CU 
for the subsample 1958-76 failed so that the fixed basic coefficients  were used to con- 
struct  this weighted average. 
50.  GEIGPE was used without lags even in the investment  equations  since its rise 
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orders  equations  all suggest  that a surge  in inflation  that raises  the abso- 
lute value  of the IVA stimulates  capital-goods  orders  simultaneously,  but 
the investment  equations  indicate  that investment  by nonfinancial  corpo- 
rations is depressed  wih a lag. These seemingly  contradictory  findings 
can be reconciled  if the "beat  inflation"  psychology  driving  up orders  in 
one quarter  leads  to some  lengthening  of the average  lag from  new orders 
to shipments.51 
With these possible exceptions,  the results  for orders  and for invest- 
ment are broadly  consistent.  While about 90 percent  of the variance  in 
the order  rates is "explained"  by the AOLS regressions,  compared  with 
95 percent of the variance  of investment  rates, autocorrelation  of the 
error  terms  is much  smaller  in the former.  Thus, RI is higher  for orders 
than for investment  rates and the Green-Watson  formula  is almost  pre- 
cisely satisfied  in the orders  equations,  indicating  consistent  estimation. 
The strength  of several  of the coefficients  on which a statistical  con- 
sensus  could be reached  is worth  exploring.  In the investment  equations, 
raising  CU by 0.025, or 3 percent of its mean of 0.833, would have 
boosted  the investment  rate  by between  2 and 3 percent  of its mean after 
one year.  The 0.12 updrift  in the capital-mix  variable  over the estimation 
period raised the gross investment  rate by almost 2 percentage  points 
from 1952 to 1976, or by considerably  more than the rise of 0.76 per- 
centage  point  in the discard  rate  estimated  for this period  with  BEA data. 
Even  though  the coefficient  of GE/GPE  may  thus  well have  been  boosted 
by some of the positive effects of other time-linked  variables-such as 
DIA, which  will later  be shown  to be significant  in the equation  for equip- 
ment  investment  alone-this  finding  is reliable  enough  to suggest  that the 
replacement  rate cannot be treated as approximately  constant  in time- 
51.  Some empirical support was found for this interpretation.  The ratio of un- 
filled orders to shipments (UIS)  at the end of a quarter  in the industry  "machinery, 
except electrical," which furnishes most equipment investments, showed a strong 
positive link to annualized  percentage changes in the deflator  for the gross domestic 
product of  nonfinancial corporations (NFCPGNP)  from that to  the succeeding 
quarter even after allowing for an independent  rise over time by use of the trend 
variable T. The quarterly regression estimate for the period 1958-76 is 
U/S  = 2.304 +  0.088ANFCPGNP  +  0.039T. 
(25.32)  (5.06)  (13.63) 
P2  =  0.89; standard  error =  0.38. 
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
This indicates  that a rise in the rate of inflation  does, in fact, stimulate  orders  tempo- 
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series analyses  of plant and equipment  investment  combined.  Less reli- 
ably,  according  to equations  4.4 and  4.6, a "rise"  of -0.6  in ICCA,  which 
would  be produced  by an absolute  increase  of $10 billion  in the inflation- 
induced  part of the CCA for nonfinancial  corporations  given that their 
gross stock of nonresidential  capital was about $1.7 trillion in 1976, 
would  depress  the investment  rate  by 5 percent.  The effect  of explicit  tax 
changes  is less clear.52  Finally, a maintained  3 percent  rise in q, whose 
mean  is almost  identical  to that  of CU, would  have raised  the investment 
rate  by 2 percent  or less after  two years  if the regression  results  are  to be 
believed. Since the standard  deviation  of the adjusted  q  (0.05)  is as 
small  as that of CU, the relative  importance  of these variables  is propor- 
tional  to the size  of their  regression  coefficients. 
Overall,  the addition  of the unadjusted  q in equations  4.2 and  4.5 yields 
little or no improvement  in fit and greatly  increases  serial  correlation  of 
the error  terms.  The coefficient  on one variable,  ICCA, which  is strongly 
correlated  with q, now becomes negative  while its expected sign is un- 
equivocally  positive. Adjusting  q by eliminating  the influence  of all the 
other  explanatory  variables  on q overcomes  this problem  in equations  4.3 
and  4.6. Yet serial  correlation  remains  higher  and RI is always  lower  than 
in the equations  without  q. However,  in none of the investment  equations 
did the estimated  absolute  error,  9, exceed 0.18, which  is about  equal  to 
the standard  error  of estimate  during  the period 1974:2 through  1976:4. 
Hence, investment  behavior  was not demonstrably  unusual  during  the 
past  few  years  in relation  to the explanatory  variables. 
All of these results  are confirmed  in table 5 when real investment  in 
equipment  and the series, "value  of manufacturers'  new orders,  capital 
goods industries,  nondefense,  in 1972 dollars"  are used to construct  new 
dependent  variables  referring  to equipment  alone.  Equipment  orders  and 
investment  are expressed  in percent  of the gross stock of equipment  in 
52. Assuming, partly for the sake of illustration, that the sum of the lag coeffi- 
cients on RCP is -2  in the investment  equation, what would a permanent  corporate- 
rate cut costing $5 billion annually accomplish?  With 1976 magnitudes,  such a cut 
would reduce RCP by about 0.3. The cumulative effect on the gross investment  rate 
reached after seven years is 1.5 percent of the real gross stock of capital employed 
by nonfinancial  corporations.  Since in 1976 this stock amounted to $1.2 trillion in 
1972 dollars, a cumulative increase in real gross investment of about $18 billion is 
involved during the adjustment  period. When the gross investment rate has fallen 
back to its original level after seven years, annual gross investment  remains 1.5 per- 
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Table 5. Regression  Results  for the Real Values  of the Rate of New Orders  of 
Nondefense  Capital-Goods  Industries  and the Rate of Investment  in Equipment, 
Nonfinancial  Corporations,  Alternative  Specifications,  Quarterly,  1952:1-1976:4a 
Rate of new orders  Rate of investment 
Independent  variable  With  With 
and regression  Without  q  With  q  adjustedqb  Without  q  With  q  adjustedqb 
statistic  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6 
Independent  variable 
Constant  15.872  3.162  13.467  4.896  -3.923  -2.387 
(5.16)  (0.55)  (2.39)  (2.05)  (-0.95)  (-0.52) 
CUl  31.644  21.722  31.358  11.359  4.575  9.671 
(5.81)  (3.54)  (5.69)  (3.20)  (1.11)  (2.70) 
D/Ad  16.559  13.591  18.432  23.157  24.696  31.537 
(1.27)  (0.96)  (1.36)  (2.33)  (2.35)  (2.80) 
IC66c  0.690  0.478  0.649  0.399  0.255  0.360 
(1.17)  (0.85)  (1.09)  (0.74)  (0.50)  (0.68) 
ICCAe  0.246  -0.862  0.453  0.177  -0.462  0.746 
(0.55)  (-1.36)  (0.75)  (0.62)  -(1.23)  (1.84) 
IVAC  -0.456  -0.444  -0.434  0.189  0.165  0.257 
(-2.36)  (-2.33)  (-2.18)  (1.50)  (1.35)  (1.98) 
RCPf  -0.704  1.636  -0.983  -1.037  0.387  -1.899 
(-0.55)  (0.88)  (-0.71)  (-0.95)  (0.31)  (-1.61) 
ICPf  1.804  1.992  1.788  0.182  0.589  0.182 
(0.94)  (0.96)  (0.94)  (0.15)  (0.48)  (0.15) 
qf  ...  12.770  2.315  ...  8.169  6.274 
(2.69)  (0.51)  (2.77)  (1.92) 
Regression  statistic 
R2  0.86  0.87  0.86  0.93  0.93  0.93 
Standard  error  0.97  0.94  0.98  0.32  0.31  0.32 
Durbin-Watson  1.93  2.02  1.94  1.68  1.82  1.78 
p  0.62  0.69  0.61  0.84  0.86  0.85 
R2  0.77  0.75  0.77  0.66  0.55  0.60 
Standard  error  1.26  1.32  1.26  0.69  0.80  0.74 
Durbin-Watson  0.68  0.55  0.69  0.25  0.17  0.20 
Sources: The new-orders variable is from  Business Conditions  Digest, various  issues, series 27;  data 
for  the investment variable were furnished by  the U.S.  Bureau of  Economic Analysis, with  quarterly 
estimates derived according to text note 32. For all other variables, see table 2 or 3 above. ICCA, IVA, 
RCP, and ICP are here divided by the gross stock of equipment of nonfinancial corporations, and expressed 
in percentage  terms. CU is entered minus its mean of 0.833. 
a.  The dependent variables are expressed as a percent of the real gross stock of equipment of nonfi- 
nancial corporations. The method of estimation used in all regressions is ordinary least squares with a 
correction for first-order  autocorrelation. The numbers in parentheses  are t statistics. 
b. Adjusted  q is defined as q  -  0.56CU  -  0.04IC66 -  0.19ICCA -  0.04IVA +  0.29RCP +  0.14ICP 
-  1.06D/A. See table 3 above, equation 3.1. 
c.  The sum of the lag coefficients is reported in the investment equations for  CU, IC66, and IVA. See 
table 2 above, note c, for a description of the lag structure. 
d. See text note 53 for a description of DIA as constructed for the investment equations. In the orders 
equation, DIA is lagged one quarter. 
e.  See table 4 above, note d, for a description of ICCA as constructed for the investment equations. 
f.  In all equations, the sum of the lag coefficients is reported for q, RCP, and ICP. See table 2 above, 
note d, for a description of the lag structure. 388  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
1972 dollars,  and tax-related  variables  are similarly  scaled  by the nomi- 
nal gross stock of equipment  of nonfinancial  corporations.  All other 
variables  and the lag structures  are unaffected  except that the variable 
reflecting  the capital-stock  mix, GE/GPE, no longer applies and that 
D/A,  lagged once in the orders equation,  is added to capture  the tax 
benefits  from  debt  financing  which  grow  over  time.  53 
Even though one might have expected that the effects of IC66 and 
lCP would be stronger  on equipment  investment  alone than on total 
investment,54  the influence  of both variables  as well as that  of RCP is still 
not well defined  in table 5, and the significance  levels of all regression 
coefficients  are about the same as before. Because the turnover  of the 
stock of equipment  is much higher  than that of structures,  the means  of 
the dependent  variables  are higher for equipment  alone55  and this ac- 
counts for an increase  in the absolute  size of some of the coefficients  in 
table 5 compared  with the corresponding  equations  in table  4. Serial  cor- 
relation  remains  high in equations  with q. Although q continues  to be 
significant  at the 5 percent  level in equations  5.2 and 5.5, it adds  little to 
the explanatory  power of the AOLS regressions  and detracts  from their 
usefulness  in forecasting  outside the observed  error  band. Furthermore, 
the adjusted  q is no longer  statistically  significant  in equations  5.3 and  5.6. 
Concluding  Comments 
From  this analysis,  I conclude  that  the use of q in equations  for capital- 
goods orders  and investment  must be regarded  as optional  at this stage. 
Using variables  in addition  to q is mandatory;  otherwise,  the resulting 
estimates  are prone  to be either  inconsistent  statistically  or fraught  with 
such serious  autocorrelation  of the error  terms  as to beg the question  of 
how such a process  can be generated  or convincingly  explained  by use of 
53. Since D/A  rises from 0.17 to 0.26 over the estimation period except for one 
slight fallback that started in  1967, a weighted average was constructed for this 
variable with lags from two through five quarters in the investment equation. The 
four weights  were 0.20, 0.44, 0.28, and 0.08, the same as those used for ICCA. 
54. This is particularly  disappointing  in view of the findings  of Hall and Jorgen- 
son in "Application  of the Theory of Optimum Capital Accumulation." 
55.  The  annualized means of  the equipment orders and investment rates are 
19.2 and 9.7 percent, respectively, and the gross stock of equipment in current and 
constant dollars was $897 billion and $635 billion, respectively, in 1976 for non- 
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q. On the other  hand, adding  q to other explanatory  variables  does not 
seem equally obligatory  since variations  in investment  and order rates 
can be explained  quite well without  it. Furthermore,  the unadjusted  q, 
while strongly  correlated  with some "nonfinancial"  variables,  does not 
distill all their  effects  on orders  and investment. The factors  influencing 
q, among  them CU and the inflation-related  IVA and ICCA, are also 
not all the same as those that are allowed to change the rental cost of 
capital  in neoclassical  formulations  so that  the securities-valuation  model 
cannot be regarded  as a substitute  for a neoclassical specification  in 
empirical  work.  If q is to remain  in contention  as a "financial"  variable,  as 
it should,  it will have  to be adjusted  and  then  compete  with  other  variables 
in aggregate  investment  and orders  equations.56  However,  like the unad- 
justed q values, the residual  q variables  constructed  in this paper,  which 
could  conceivably  convey  the effects  of not directly  observable  changes  in 
the real interest  rate,  expectations,  and  risk  aversion,  served  mainly  to in- 
crease  serial  correlation,  though  q is statistically  significant  in five out of 
eight  multiple  regressions. 
Because the theory  explaining  why q should  matter  greatly  to invest- 
ment is most persuasive,  this finding  is distressing.  Perhaps,  however,  it 
is not as surprising  as it may  seem  at first,  considering  the aggregate  nature 
of the changes  in q used  in this  paper. 
Stocks do not move up and down precisely  in unison; some stocks, 
indeed,  are  known  to move counter  to the averages.  Still, since  the aggre- 
gate q mirrors  major  and  persistent  changes  in the q of most firms,  it may 
be instructive  to ask how firms  should react to a uniform  decline  in the 
stock market  that leaves their  relative  positions  unchanged.  After such a 
development  they  would  be no more  likely  to merge  through  an exchange 
of stock or through  stock tenders  since the value of the stock of all of 
them has declined  by the same proportion,  leaving the equity cost (as 
opposed  to cash  cost) of acquisitions  unchanged. 
Corporations  would  still have an incentive  to use cash  tenders  financed 
either  by drawing  down  liquid  assets  or by issuing  debt to acquire  invest- 
ment goods second-hand  rather  than through  new orders  from capital- 
56. Some of  the adjustments may be excessive if  monetary and fiscal policy 
pursue similar goals. For instance, in the fall of  1966, suspension  of the investment 
tax credit, a credit crunch, and a decline in the stock market all came together so 
that it is difficult  to know whether eliminating the effect of IC66 on q does not also 
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goods producers.  However, mergers  financed  in this way are generally 
small in relation  to the size of the acquiring  company  and hardly  suffi- 
cient to drive  up average  stock prices, even if legal obstacles  to mergers 
could  be ignored. 
With a uniform  decline in the stock market, corporations  may still 
choose, instead  of investing  in producers'  durables,  to increase  their fi- 
nancial  investment  and liquid assets, or reduce  their debt or repurchase 
stock  in hopes of raising  their  average  q. Since stockholders  need not be 
convinced  that a firm's  financial  management  is necessarily  superior  to its 
plant, production,  and sales management,  such a policy is unlikely to 
succeed for individual  firms, and stockholders  may press for increased 
payout.57  If many  firms  nevertheless  reduce  their  net liabilities  outstand- 
ing, such a policy will ultimately  raise  the market  valuation  of all corpo- 
rate  liabilities  relative  to other  assets  in investor  portfolios  (although  this 
portfolio-composition  effect  is external  to the individual  firm). 
To the extent expansion  is financed  internally,  nothing evident here 
compels firms to reduce their investment  in producers'  durables  when 
their  q has  declined  spontaneously,  and  not just  in sympathy  with  negative 
nonfinancial  factors  already  in evidence,  by as much as everybody  else's. 
No major  relevant  alternative  is demonstrably  superior  to proceeding  with 
internally  financed  investment  as usual when q, adjusted  for cyclical,  in- 
flation, and tax effects,  declines  uniformly.  Thus, the forces driving  the 
adjusted  q back to equilibrium  may be extremely  weak.  This  may explain 
why the autocorrelation-adjustment  coefficient,  p, is still fairly  high  in the 
equation  for q and why the inclusion  of q in the investment  and orders 
equations,  in turn, increases  the degree of autocorrelation  of the error 
terms  in those  equations. 
As to the external  financing,  it remains  true  that  the cost of new equity 
issues is raised  by a decline  in the value of equity  in the numerator  of q. 
The cost of debt finance  may increase at the same time; in fact q has 
57. Increasing dividend payout rates may be resisted because it implies a hard- 
to-reverse commitment to slower growth which individual companies are loath to 
make unless their competitors  do likewise. In 1971, the ratio of dividends  to after-tax 
corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment  and capital consumption ad- 
justment plus the reduction in real indebtedness  was 48.7 percent, compared with 
48.4 percent in 1976. Hence there is no evidence that corporations  as a group have 
chosen to increase dividend  payout under the pressure  of a succession of low qs. For 
the estimated  reduction  in real indebtedness  see von Furstenberg  and Malkiel, "Finan- 
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moved  inversely  to nominal  interest  yields, such as the rate on A bonds, 
during  1965-76. But  the cost of debt  will not necessarily  rise  if the growth 
of the money supply is not reduced when the equity component  of q 
declines. 
As the supply  of new equity  issues dwindles  and the volume of bond 
offerings  grow,  lenders  may well be willing  to absorb  greater  amounts  of 
corporate  debt  and  fewer  stocks  without  a significant  rise  in the bond  rate. 
I know of no empirical  demonstration  that the aggregate  real bond rate 
has risen  systematically  over the last decade  on account  of the growth  in 
the share  of debt in the market  value of firms.58  Given the difficulties  of 
inferring  the relevant  after-tax  real rates from nominal  bond yields, the 
prospects  that a convincing  demonstration  can ever be made appear 
slim.59  What  is true,  ceteris  paribus,  for individual  firms  with rising  debt- 
equity ratios thus need not be true in the aggregate  when most firms 
experience  a similar  fate and  traditional  credit  standards  and  lending  pre- 
scripts  have time to adjust  to a change  in circumstances  prevailing  every- 
where.  Also, the q equations  yielded  no evidence  that a rise in the debt- 
financing  percentage  depresses  q on account  of increased  leverage  risks, 
particularly  for stockholders.  Hence nonfinancial  corporations  taken 
together  may not yet have exceeded the debt-financing  percentage  that 
financial  investors  regard  as "optimal."  Thus it is not obvious that the 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector must experience  a marked  increase  in the 
cost of external  funds and react with a reduction  in externally  financed 
investment  to a decline  in q; this observation  holds at least  for those com- 
panies favored with access to the bond market,  who can become more 
heavily dependent  on debt funds as time goes on or until the adjusted  q 
revives. 
58. The growth in the share of debt in the market value of nonfinancial firms 
can be calculated readily from table 1. From 1968:4 to 1974:4 the share grew from 
23 percent  to 45 percent,  but it then declined to 38 percent  in 1976:4. 
59. Tobin and Brainard compute an illustrative Baa "real" rate by subtracting 
the geometric average inflation rate of the preceding five years. However, on this 
basis, the "real"  Baa rate was found to rise consistently from 1964 to 1970 and to 
fall consistently from 1970 to 1973 while the share of debt rose. Hence the odds are 
against finding a significant  positive effect of higher debt ratios on the Baa yield. 
See Tobin and Brainard,  "Asset Markets,"  pp. 255-56, 261. For diverse comparisons 
of equally rationally  construed  expected real rates with the ex post real rate on short- 
term instruments,  see J. W. Elliott, "Measuring  the Expected Real Rate of Interest: 
An Exploration  of Macroeconomic Alternatives,"  American Economic Review, vol. 
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One final  caution:  While  balance-sheet  factors  and market  valuations 
may not have been of major consequence  for aggregate  investment  to 
date, it is dangerous  to extrapolate  this tentative  finding.  Perhaps,  cor- 
porate  investment  planners  hold inelastic  and  infrequently  revised  expec- 
tations about the normal  or "permanent"  level of q or of more readily 
observable  variables  with similar  information  content.  However,  should 
the unadjusted  q continue  below its normal  level of around  0.8 for very 
much longer, their convictions  may eventually  be shaken.  Even though 
the adjusted  q was slightly  above  its average  during  the last half of 1976, 
and even though  the unadjusted  q may be telling corporate  investment 
planners  little more than what they already  know by looking at current 
inflation,  capacity  utilization,  and tax factors,  they may come more and 
more  to share  the negative  sentiments  of investors.  They may lose confi- 
dence that q will tend, as it has done in the past, to come along in any 
cyclical  recovery  that  is not accompanied  by accelerating  inflation. 
For the time  being,  however,  the reach  of capacity  utilization  above  its 
1952-76 average  level of 0.833 and the continued  containment  of infla- 
tion in 1977 seem more important  in appraising  the outlook for invest- 
ment  in 1978 than the likelihood  that q reached  a new low in 1977. The 
coming  year should  thus  bring  a clear  test of how little-or  how much- 
q matters  when  it moves  counter  to "nonfinancial"  variables  with  which  it 
is normally  correlated  closely. In the meantime,  the search  for variables 
other  than  the residual  q that  may  properly  reflect  the influence  of "finan- 
cial"  factors  on investment  under  inflationary  conditions  must  continue. 
APPENDIX 
Tax Factors  and the After-Tax  Rate of 
Return  of Nonfinancial  Corporations 
THE  AFTER-TAX  return  on the domestic  capital  employed  by nonfinancial 
corporations  consists  of profits  on the national  income  accounts  basis  with 
the inventory  valuation  adjustment,  IVA, and capital consumption  ad- 
justment,  CCA, minus profits-tax  liabilities and plus net interest  paid. 
This total is divided  by the replacement  cost of the net fixed  capital  stock, 
inventories,  and  land ("other  assets"  in table 1  ) and  the result  multiplied George  M. von Furstenberg  393 
by 100 to yield quarterly  estimates  of the annualized  after-tax  rate of re- 
turn,  A TR. While  it can be argued  that  the net noninterest-bearing  finan- 
cial assets of corporations  also yield productive  services,  I decided to 
follow Feldstein  and Summers  in omitting  such assets  from the denomi- 
nator. 
Because  of the existence  of fixed  costs and  cyclical  factors,  which  influ- 
ence the width  of the markup  applied  to unit variable  costs, the after-tax 
rate of return  is positively  related to the capacity-utilization  rate, CU, 
which is entered  as one-hundredth  of the Federal Reserve index of ca- 
pacity  utilization  in manufacturing  minus  its mean of 0.833. While I re- 
gard  capacity  utilization  as a variable  that is much  more  relevant  for the 
determination  of the returns  on capital  than the unemployment  rate or 
the output gap, changes in the total civilian unemployment  rate are 
used  to capture  asymmetries  during  the  business  cycle. With  labor  hoard- 
ing depressing  profits  in the downswing  and more intensive  utilization  of 
labor bolstering  profits  in the upswing,  one would expect the change  in 
the unemployment  variable,  DU, to have a negative  influence  on the rate 
of return  at a given  CU. 
Even a neutral  inflationary  process  that does not affect  price-cost  re- 
lationships  before  taxes affects  after-tax  profits  to the extent  that it raises 
inventory  profits and lowers the real value of depreciation  allowances 
while higher inflation  premiums  gradually  raise the real value of the 
deductibility  of net interest  paid. However, book profits  are also influ- 
enced  by changes  in depreciation  rules  and  in tax service  lives. Attempting 
to separate  the effects  of inflation  and  of changes  in the law, I use the vari- 
ables  IVA, ICCA, and  D/A  described  in the text for the former  and treat 
the depreciation  provisions  as one of the components  of the total tax- 
change  variable,  TR. Since additional  acceleration  is, in fact, only gradu- 
ally adopted  by business  once it is permitted  by law, I use BEA estimates 
of the annualized  changes  in federal  profits-tax  receipts  that  have  resulted 
from  changes  in depreciation  provisions  as a guide. 
The last variable,  TR, which represents  all major  explicit  tax changes 
and is expressed  in percent  of the same capital-stock  variable  as A  TR, 
IVA, and  ICCA, is the most difficult  to construct.  Changes  in tax accru- 
als due to permanent  statutory  changes  in federal corporate-profits  tax 
rates,  in the investment  tax credit,  and  in depreciation  provisions  must  be 
determined  and then phased  out over time. Tax amounts  resulting  from 
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1 for as long as they remain  in effect.  While state and local tax changes 
are, of course,  just as relevant  in principle,  I assume  that such changes 
and the adjustments  they induce  are sufficiently  small and continuous  as 
to produce  no major  displacements.  The phaseout  is handled  by applying 
weights (w),  calculated  from a quadratic  (reverse) Pascal distribution 
function,  starting  at 1 in the quarter  (k =  -  1) in which the tax change 
is made,  to the variable  tax amounts  resulting  from or saved  by a perma- 
nent  change  in law  in that  and  subsequent  quarters.60  Analytically, 
(A-1)  Wk  =  (1  -  p)k+l[l  +  (k +  l)p], 
where p is a small fraction determining  the rate at which the weights 
decline. 
If p is as large as 0.18, the response  of investment  to the change  in 
taxes is substantially  completed  within  five  years;  while, at the upper  end 
of the plausible  range,  lags extending  over a period  of up to seven  years 
imply a p of 0.12.61 Adding one year to eliminate  the tail of each distri- 
bution, I therefore  experimented  with alternative  lag structures  in con- 
structing  the numerators  of TR24 and TR32, where  the numeral  on TR 
indicates  the maximum  length  of lag in quarters.62 
60. This distribution function of  the weights showing the fraction of the total 
tax effects still to come in any quarter  yields a pattern of first accelerating  and then 
decelerating  decline. A parabolic frequency  function yielding such a pattern  is called 
for since almost all studies of tax effects on investment have found that the invest- 
ment impact of any tax change reaches its peak two or three years after any change. 
61. For  a  discussion of  lag  structures see  Dale  W. Jorgenson and James A. 
Stephenson, "The Time Structure of Investment Behavior in United States Manu- 
facturing, 1947-1960,"  Review  of  Economics and Statistics, vol.  49  (February 
1967),  pp. 16-27; and the two articles by Dale W. Jorgenson, Jerald Hunter, and 
M. Ishaq Nadiri, "A Comparison of Alternative Econometric Models of Quarterly 
Investment  Behavior,"  Econometrica,  vol. 38 (March 1970), pp. 187-212, and "The 
Predictive Performance  of Econometric Models of Quarterly  Investment Behavior," 
ibid., pp. 213-24.  See also Charles W. Bischoff, "Business  Investment in the 1970s: 
A Comparison  of Models,"  BPEA, 1:1971, pp. 13-58. 
62. To give an indication of the time shape of the weights used, the weights are 
shown for the third quarter  after any change (k = 2), the seventh quarter  after, and 
so on every four quarters  up to the twenty-third  or thirty-first  quarter,  as applicable. 
For TR24, these weights are 0.85, 0.56, 0.34, 0.19, 0.10 and 0.02. For TR32, they 
are 0.93, 0.75, 0.57, 0.41, 0.29, 0.20, 0.12, and 0.01. The tail of the distribution  is 
wedged off linearly during the sixth year for TR24 and over the last six quarters  for 
TR32. A table showing the estimated components of the numerator  of TR24 is con- 
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Interpretation  of Results 
Regression  results  obtained  with both TR24 and TR32  are reported 
in table  A-1, with  a time  trend (T) contained  in some  runs.  Overall,  these 
two sets of equations  yield similar  results.  A slight  preference  in favor of 
the shorter  lag structure  reflected  in the construction  of TR24  can be 
established  only by considering  the expected size of the coefficient  on 
TR. If tax changes  are  not systematically  related  to cyclical  conditions,  so 
that tax increases  do not always  come in advanced  stages  of expansions 
and tax cuts in severe contractions  as automatic  implementation  of sta- 
bilization  rules might suggest,  TR should have a coefficient  not signifi- 
cantly  different  from -1.  In that  case, a $1 cut in corporate  income  taxes 
would simply  produce an equal addition  to the after-tax  return  before 
the capital  stock  has had time  to adjust.  The coefficients  on TR meet this 
requirement  at the 5 percent  level only  with  TR24. 
Similarly,  the coefficients  on both ICCA and IVA should not be sig- 
nificantly  different  from the average  tax rate on corporate  income of 
around  0.4 if these variables  reduce the after-tax  return  simply  by the 
amount  of the additional  taxes due to a rise in underdepreciation  or in in- 
ventory  profits.  This requirement  is met for ICCA, but the coefficient  on 
IVA is significantly  greater  than 0.4 in all equations;  the difference  from 
0.4 is significant  not because  the coefficient  is much larger  than that on 
ICCA,  but  because  its standard  error  is much  smaller. 
Bursts  of inflation  thus appear  to depress  the after-tax  return  not only 
on account  of the additional  tax liabilities  precipitated  by inventory  profits 
but  for other  reasons  as well.63 
As expected, a rising  debt-asset  ratio provides  some relief from the 
tax effects  of inflation  and bolsters  the after-tax  rate of return.  However, 
this finding  is clouded  by the trendlike  rise in the debt-asset  ratio (D/A) 
from 17 percent  in 1952:1 to 26 percent  in 1976:4. In fact, table A-1 
shows  that  if time is run  together  with  D/A, the time  trend  retains  its sig- 
63. The fear that contractive monetary and fiscal policies may be triggered by 
inflation may delay the adjustment  of final-goods prices to cost increases. Contract 
rigidities and adjustment  lags can also prevent increases in prices of basic-materials 
inputs from passing through quickly to the finished-goods  stage so that processing 
margins may decline, particularly  in the administered-price  sectors of the economy. 
For an analysis of the latter issue, see Steven Lustgarten,  Industrial Concentration 
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Table A-1. Regression  Results  for the After-Tax  Rate of Return  of Nonfinancial 
Corporations,  Alternative  Specifications,  Quarterly,  1952:1-1976:4a 
Independent  variable  TR lagged  24 quartersb  TR lagged  32 quartersb 
and regression  statistic  A.]  A.2  A.3  A.4  A.S  A.6 
Intdependent  variable 
Constant  4.643  5.830  5.460  4.836  5.830  5.669 
(6.66)  (19.26)  (7.28)  (7.93)  (22.00)  (8.05) 
CU  11.604  12.033  11.983  11.799  12.153  12.122 
(11.39)  (12.11)  (11.93)  (12.32)  (12.98)  (12.78) 
DU  -0.222  -0.216  -0.216  -0.231  -0.225  -0.225 
(-4.29)  (-4.26)  (-4.24)  (-4.69)  (-4.68)  (-4.65) 
TR  -1.283  -1.321  -1.311  -1.345  -1.354  -1.348 
(-7.30)  (-7.82)  (-7.68)  (-8.62)  (-9.07)  (-8.86) 
ICCA  0.650  0.811  0.798  0.562  0.678  0.671 
(3.34)  (4.28)  (4.16)  (3.21)  (3.91)  (3.80) 
IVA  0.765  0.804  0.799  0.758  0.793  0.790 
(12.54)  (13.36)  (13.05)  (13.21)  (13.87)  (13.60) 
DIA  7.848  ...  1.949  6.605  ...  0.888 
(2.70)  (0.51)  (2.57)  (0.24) 
T  ...  0.015  0.013  ...  0.012  0.011 
(3.76)  (2.31)  (3.46)  (2.17) 
Regression  statistic 
R2  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 
Standard  error  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.15 
Durbin-Watson  1.71  1.87  1.85  1.73  1.88  1.87 
p  0.86  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.84  0.84 
AU  0.88  0.86  0.86  0.88  0.87  0.87 
Standard  error  0.42  0.45  0.45  0.41  0.43  0.44 
Durbin-Watson  0.16  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.14 
Sources: The numerator  of ATR is from U.S. Bureau  of Economic Analysis, National Income  and Product 
Accounts  of the United States, 1929-74: Statistical Tables (GPO, 1977), table 1.15, and Survey of  Current 
Business,  various issues, while the denominator is "other assets" from table I above, column 2; DU is avail- 
able from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; TR was derived by the author and is available from him 
in a longer version of this appendix; remaining variables are from sources listed in table 2 or 3 above. All 
variables are defined in the text of the appendix. TR, ICCA, and IVA are divided by "other assets." and 
expressed in percentage terms. CU is entered minus its mean value of 0.833. 
ATR for 1953:4 was raised from 3.30 to  3.90 percent to adjust for post-Korean conversion costs and 
the anomalous anticipation of expenses encouraged by the expiration of the excess-profits  tax at the end of 
that quarter.  For a justification,  see Survey  of Current  Business, vol. 34 (May 1954), p. 6. After the adjust- 
ment, the prediction error  for that quarter  is still almost twice the standard  error of estimate. The regression 
coefficients  and significance  levels obtained with this adjustment turned out to be very close to those ob- 
tained for the subsample starting in 1954:1. 
a.  The dependent vailable is expressed as a percent of "other assets." The method of estimation is ordi- 
nary least squares with a correction for first-order  autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt  technique 
throughout.  The numbers in parentheses  are t statistics. 
b. For a description of the lag structure,  see the appendix text. 
c.  As explained in the text, P2  is not fitted but calculated as 1 - 1(N  -  1)/(N  -  K(u2/2y2)].  N  -  K 
indicates the number of degrees of freedom from N  observations, y is the dependent variable (in  mean 
deviants),  and u is the difference  between y and the value of y predicted  with the set of coefficients  found in 
the regression  after setting p equal to zero in solving for the predicted  value of y. George  M. von Furstenberg  397 
nificance  while D/A  does not. There is some evidence,  therefore,  that 
the underlying  after-tax  rate of return  has risen  over time.  This finding  is 
not entirely  unexpected  since the effective  tax rate has declined. If the 
coefficient  on T is to be believed,  the cumulative  rise  in ATR amounts  to 
at least 1 percentage  point from 1952:1 to 1976:4, or to almost  20 per- 
cent of the annualized  mean  of 5.27 over this period.  This finding  holds, 
of course,  only ceteris  paribus  in a world in which inflation  at least has 
been decidedly impar. If IVA is eliminated  from the regressions  con- 
taining  T in table  A-1, the coefficient  on T is always  completely  insignifi- 
cant. 
Overall,  the fit of the equations  is very  close, particularly  in view of the 
fact  that  ATR varied  over  a wide  range,  from  2.75 percent  to 7.93 percent 
of net capital. The "forecasting"  ability  of the coefficients  other than p 
found in the AOLS regressions  is also good since RI is still over 85 per- 
cent  when  the contribution  of the first-order  Markov  process  to reducing 
the unexplained  sum  of squares  is denied.  For these  reasons  it may be in- 
teresting  to interpret  the  remaining  regression  coefficients,  on CU and  DU, 
for which  a priori  expectations  extend  only to sign.  Increasing  unemploy- 
ment  by 1 percentage  point reduces  ATR in that quarter  by about  0.2, or 
by around  4 percent  of its mean of 5.3. Lowering  CU by 0.025, or by 3 
percent  of its original  mean of 0.833, on the other hand, reduces  ATR 
by 0.3, and the effect persists.  This result clearly shows that capacity 
utilization  must be regarded  as a strong candidate  for inclusion  in the 
equations  for capital-goods  orders  and investment.  The same holds for 
most of the explicit  tax-change  variables  in TR and the implicit  tax vari- 
ables  ICCA, IVA, and  D/A,  though  D/A  was found  to interact  strongly 
with the time trend.  Furthermore,  like temporary  tax changes,  the inven- 
tory valuation  adjustment  may reflect  mainly  transitory  forces. It would 
have to affect  the profitability  not only of past but also of future  invest- 
ments  if it is to be as important  a determinant  of the rate  of capital-goods 
orders  as it appears  to be of the actual  after-tax  rate of return.  The same 
comment  would  apply  to cyclical  indicators,  such  as capacity  utilization,  if 
businessmen  still had faith that swings  in business  conditions  follow the 
laws  of the pendulum,  for in that  case present  conditions  would  be a poor 
predictor  of future  business  conditions.64 
64. A longer version of this appendix and the paper by Green and Watson cited 
in note 34, which was originally prepared for this study, are available from the 
author. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Michael  C. Lovell:  If proof were needed  that James  Tobin's  q has come 
of age, it is offered by the 1977 Economic Report of the President, which 
presents  in table 1 the ratio of the market  value of corporate  assets to 
their  replacement  cost. George  von Furstenberg  has done us a great  ser- 
vice by providing  a sterling  account  of what  factors  determine  q and  how 
q in turn  influences  investment  behavior. 
Von Furstenberg's  quarterly  q series,  spanning  1952 through  1976, is 
provocative  from three  perspectives.  First,  a self-appointed  shadow  open 
market  committee  that  defined  policy as "stabilizing"  when q is higher  at 
the trough  than at the preceding  peak of the business  cycle would  obtain 
a rather  mixed story. His series suggests  that, by this definition,  policy 
was stabilizing  in 1954 and 1961 but destabilizing  in 1958, 1970, and 
1975. (However,  my own view is that  one should  not grade  either  mone- 
tary or fiscal  policy in terms  of q or any other single  index. Stabilization 
strategies  should  be evaluated  by comparing  alternative  simulation  paths 
generated  with an appropriately  specified  econometric  model.) 
Second, a future  economic  historian  interested  in appraising  the con- 
tributions  of the 1964 tax cut will find the analysis  confounded  by the 
record  q attained  in 1965. Was the historic  high the result  of the tax cut 
or was  it the consequence  of monetary  policy? 
Third,  current  and  recent  levels of q are exceedingly  low, and indicate 
that policy in 1975 was at its tightest  since the Korean  War. The 1977 
Economic  Report  concludes  that  the phenomenally  low q should  be com- 
bated  with a cut in the corporate  profits  tax and the restoration  of confi- 
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dence. But Tobin and Brainard  have argued  that "tight  anti-inflationary 
monetary  policies  were  undoubtedly  responsible."' 
If q is indeed the fulcrum  by which monetary  and fiscal policy exert 
leverage  on the economy,  it is important  to find out what determines  it. 
Von Furstenberg's  regression  results  indicate  that  changes  in depreciation 
allowances  and  temporary  changes  in tax rates  do not influence  q appreci- 
ably. However,  a permanent  change  in the corporate  tax rate has a sta- 
tistically  significant  effect.  A  10 percent  cut in the corporate  profits  tax 
would increase  q by about 4 percent  during  the first quarter  it was in 
effect. This supports  the policy recommendation  presented  in the 1977 
Economic Report. In perspective,  however,  that  is not a tremendous  bang 
for the buck, and the case for changes  in the permanent  rate is strongest 
as a means  of combating  secular  stagnation  rather  than  economic  fluctua- 
tions. 
I am concerned  with two problems  with these regressions.  First,  mon- 
etary  variables  are  not included.  I do not believe  that  monetary  and  fiscal 
variables  are  uncorrelated,  and  I suspect  that  the coefficients  on the fiscal 
variables  are exaggerated  as a result  of this omission;  that is, the role of 
fiscal policy is overstated.  Second, if it is true that inflationary  factors 
influence  q, as the analysis  assumes,  it may also be true  that  q influences 
inflation  via its effects  on investment  and aggregate  activity;  single-equa- 
tion regressions  cannot untangle  all of these interactions.  Thus, the re- 
gressions  in table 3 suggest  that one might  predict  q fairly closely from 
the contemporary  movements  of the variables  included  in the regressions, 
but they do not answer  many  of the interesting  structural  questions. 
As I understand  it, q is supposed  to have its primary  impact  on aggre- 
gate demand  through  its effects  on investment  spending.  I am struck  by 
the similarities  between  q theory and the neoclassical  approach  of Dale 
Jorgenson,  Robert  Hall, and others.  In particular,  they share  the follow- 
ing characteristics:  (1)  Both theories  try to summarize  the firm's  target 
in terms  of a single  variable,  q for Tobin and the ratio of current  output 
to user cost in the neoclassical  model. Can it be all that simple? (2) 
Neither approach  works out the dynamics of the adjustment  process 
1. James Tobin and William C. Brainard,  "Asset Markets and the Cost of Capi- 
tal," in Bela Balassa and Richard Nelson, eds., Economic Progress, Private Values, 
and Public Policy, Essays in Honor o1 William  Fellner (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 
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within  the context  of a carefully  articulated  optimization  framework  that 
would specifically  incorporate  the process  of expectation  formation  and 
adjustment  costs. In this respect,  both theories  are dominated  by a num- 
ber of contributions  that have derived  the optimal  time path of adjust- 
ment simultaneously  with the determination  of the properties  of the ulti- 
mate long-run  equilibrium.2 
If you think  that  Jorgenson  and  his coworkers  have succeeded  in mea- 
suring  user cost with high precision;  if you buy the convenience  of the 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function;  and if you are not worried  about  re- 
liance solely on the current  level to the exclusion  of the anticipated  time 
profile  of sales in defining  the equilibrium  stock-then  you may  not need 
to pray  hard  for the success  of q. My own suspicion  is that  the q approach 
may be particularly  fruitful  for cross-sectional  work because  it does not 
rely on the assumption  that the firm's  sales are exogenous.  For aggregate 
time series,  much  may  depend  on the relative  seriousness  of measurement 
errors  in trying  to determine  q on the one hand  and  user  cost on the other. 
While  q does have in its favor  the use of market estimates  of the long-run 
prospects  of the firm  rather  than  reliance  on the ratio of current  sales to 
user cost, there  is the difficulty  of distinguishing  marginal  from  average  q; 
the replacement  cost of net fixed  assets  seems  a particularly  difficult  thing 
to measure. 
My own view is that the empirical  results  in this paper,  while fasci- 
nating,  are not as negative  for q theory as the author  implies.  Capacity 
utilization  also appears  important,  but it stars in the orders equations 
more  than  in the investment  equations;  and  it may  work  there  because  the 
fixed coefficients  of the Almon lag are inadequate  to capture  the stretch- 
out that occurs when the machinery  industry  is operating  all out. The 
replication  of Popkin's  results  suggests  that something  more  is needed.  I 
regard  the regressions  that include  both q and capacity  utilization  as the 
most  informative  in tables  4 and  5; note that  q always  has a significant  co- 
efficient  even when it is placed in tandem  with the lag and accelerator 
effect  of capacity  utilization  and  a host of other  variables.  The regressions 
2.  Charles C. Holt and others, Planning  Production,  Inventories,  and Work  Force 
(Prentice-Hall, 1960); Robert Eisner and Robert H. Strotz, "Determinants  of Busi- 
ness Investment,"  in Daniel B. Suits and others, Impacts of Monetary Policy, a series 
of research studies prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit (Prentice- 
Hall, 1963), pp. 59-233;  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Optimal  Investment Policy and the 
Flexible Accelerator,"  International  Economic Review, vol. 8 (February 1967), pp. 
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with adjusted  q make q look somewhat  less important,  but these regres- 
sions use the residuals  obtained  from an auxiliary  regression  of q on all 
the other explanatory  variables except GE/GPE in table 4; this pro- 
cedure  doesn't  change  the standard  error  of q very  much,  but it does re- 
duce its regression  coefficient  and  hence  its level of significance.  But these 
adjusted  q regressions  give q last pickings  beyond  what  all the other  vari- 
ables  can do, and I discount  them. (We could tilt the story  the other  way 
by replacing  capacity  utilization  with the residuals  obtained  when  it is re- 
gressed  on q and other variables  as well; this would make CU look less 
important  and puff q. The procedure  is also suspect  if the first  regression 
of table  3 does  not adequately  explain  the generation  of q.) 
Von Furstenberg  warns  us that the autorogressive  transformation  re- 
gressions  may not be adequate.  It should be noted that even if the dis- 
turbances  are not distributed  independently  of each other, the least- 
squares  approach  does  not lead  to inconsistent  estimates  of the  parameters 
of the regression  model;  however,  the least-squares  estimates  of the pa- 
rameters  will be inefficient  and the customary  t coefficients  will be dis- 
torted. The autoregressive  transformation  corrects  for this if the error 
term  is generated  by a first-order  autoregressive  process.  The author  ap- 
plies a test, indicating  that the stochastic  disturbance  is not first-order 
autoregressive;  however, significance  levels of his test statistic are not 
available.  I am not persuaded  that any evidence  of "inconsistent  estima- 
tion" has been uncovered.  I think that AOLS should have been aban- 
doned  sooner  with a less determined  rescue  operation  of adding  variables. 
The use of other diagnostic  procedures  and further  investigation  may 
reveal  that the stochastic  process  generating  the error  terms  is more  com- 
plicated,  possibly  moving  average,  and  I think  this should  be checked  out. 
It is also possible  that  the problem  arises  from  misspecification-perhaps 
the Almon  lag structure  is too restrictive  a way of modeling  the lag struc- 
ture;  q deserves  to be coupled  with rational  distributed  lags in explaining 
investment.  Pending further evidence on these alternatives  I think we 
must  suspend  judgment  on the merits  of q. 
James Tobin: I'm not sure that Lovell is quite correct  to speak of the 
coming  of age of an idea that goes back at least as far as Wicksell,  not to 
mention  Keynes.  But it seems that q has come of age-every  recent  ses- 
sion of this panel seems  to have had a paper  relating  to it. 
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classical  theory,  a la Jorgenson.  His point seemed  to be that only incom- 
plete information  and  delivery  lags accounted  for apparent  disequilibrium 
values  of q and  for their  relation  to investment  in regressions.  Otherwise, 
investment  would keep q at one. Now q is being hit from the opposite 
side: von Furstenberg  is saying  that, in the aggregate,  q has very  little to 
do with  investment.  The forces  that  keep q at par are  very  weak;  to para- 
phrase  his argument,  securities-market  valuation  is a side show. 
Von Furstenberg  has performed  extremely  useful empirical  calcula- 
tions. He deserves  our thanks  for his improvements  on our previous  esti- 
mates  and,  in particular,  for the care  with  which  he handled  the valuation 
of bonds. 
The paper seems to have two principal  messages: One is that only 
relative q matters;  relative qs determine  the allocation of investment 
among  sectors,  industries,  and firms,  but overall q has little or no effect 
on overall investment.  The other message  is that, of the factors  that in- 
fluence  q, those related  to current  and prospective  earnings-to the mar- 
ginal  efficiency  of capital-do  affect  investment,  whereas  the rate  at which 
earnings  are discounted-the cost of capital-does  not. Taken  together, 
these propositions  imply  that monetary  policy and  financial  variables  are 
irrelevant  to aggregate  investment,  except insofar as they may influence 
profits  and profitability  by affecting  economic  activity  through  some dif- 
ferent  channel-for  example,  housing.  Von Furstenberg's  explanation  of 
nonresidential  investment  seems,  in effect,  to revert  to the cash-flow  and 
liquidity  theories  of Meyer  and Kuh. While I believe  that liquidity  is im- 
portant  in the investment  story, I do not find the pure cash-flow  model 
theoretically  appealing  or empirically  convincing.  Von Furstenberg  has 
added  no new evidence  in its favor. 
The notion that q does not matter  in the aggregate  has some credi- 
bility  because  the downward  trend  in q since  the mid-1960s  has not been 
accompanied  by a comparable  downward  trend in capital  investment.  I 
too find this a puzzle. It is true that regressions  such as Ciccolo's, suc- 
cessful as they have been in forecasts,  are virtually  first-difference  equa- 
tions;  the rho coefficient  is almost  equal  to one. It is also true  that  without 
correction  for serial correlation  of residuals,  those regressions  seriously 
underpredict  investment  in the 1950s. I agree  that  improvements  in speci- 
fications are required.  To that end Ciccolo, some of my colleagues at 
Yale, and I have been trying to incorporate  tax credits and other tax 
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model in an appropriate  nonlinear  way our hypothesis  that the relation- 
ship reflects,  at least in part,  the way in which adjustment  costs vary  with 
the speed  of capital  formation. 
Like Lovell, I do not understand  the logic of using "adjusted  q"-the 
variation  of q that cannot be explained  by other variables-to  explain 
investment.  To the extent that those other variables  are the same ones 
used in the investment  equation,  the procedure  is innocuous  but redun- 
dant. However, they are not quite the same. So why is this particular 
variable  only the residual  claimant?  Nor do I follow the argument  that, 
since other variables  explain 85 percent  of the variance  of q, nothing  is 
left for financial  variables  to explain.  It may very  well be that a group  of 
financial  variables,  or any set of variables  taken at random  out of a data 
bank,  could also account  for 85 percent  of the variance. 
In the article  Lovell mentioned,  Brainard  and I used cross-sections  of 
firms  year by year and tried  to control  profits  and expected  profits  to see 
how the market  would value a firm  of constant  and representative  earn- 
ings and other characteristics.  We found that a lot of year-to-year  varia- 
tion remained  in q, evidently  due to monetary  or financial  factors,  or, to 
be more cautious, to factors that were not among our measures  of the 
fundamental  firm characteristics  used in the valuation regressions.  In 
1974, for example, the q of our hypothetical  representative  firm, one 
with the same profits  and profit  prospects  as in previous  years,  declined 
sharply.  Surely  this decline was heavily  influenced  by monetary  policies 
and events during  that year. 
One explanation  of the weakness  of investment  in 1974 and since is 
the collapse  of q, a collapse  partly  attributable  to monetary  and  financial 
factors. Von Furstenberg's  alternative  is that investment  has been de- 
terred  by the increased  bite of corporate  taxation  incident  to inflation. 
Most of the statistical  action  of the variables  he uses  to measure  this effect 
occurred  during  the last two years of his sample. During  this period, q 
was also low, and a number  of other well-known  extraordinary  events 
occurred  as well. Consequently,  we are confronted  with an acute am- 
biguity  of identification. 
Several  of von Furstenberg's  independent  variables,  notably  the capital 
consumption  adjustment  (CCA)  and IVA, are meant to capture the 
negative  effects  of inflation  on investment.  I am not sure of the logic of 
his specification.  The losses due to CCA have already  taken  place. Only 
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would  historical  values  of CCA  be appropriate  in an investment  equation. 
Likewise,  the damage  to profits  from  inflation  attributable  to IVA occurs 
only when firms  stubbornly  stick to FIFO and hence incur  higher  taxes. 
There  is a similar  weakness  in von Furstenberg's  use of the debt-asset 
ratio.  This is included  in the regressions  along  with the tax variables  only 
because  it might  be a source of countervailing  gains from inflation.  But 
these too are bygones unless comparable  inflation-induced  increases  of 
nominal  interest  rates  are  expected  in future.  Incidentally,  it seems  strange 
that  von Furstenberg  is so concerned  about  the value  of the tax deduction 
for interest  when he does not use interest  rates  or related  variables  as an 
explanatory  variable  for investment. 
Von Furstenberg's  investment  regressions  do not substantiate  his claim 
that  the other  variables  render  q redundant.  Even  in the adjusted  versions 
of the equations,  q maintains  its value and significance.  The coefficients 
obtained  by von Furstenberg  on q are quite robust  and are generally  in 
the range  of estimates  by others,  such as Ciccolo-implying an elasticity 
of investment  with respect  to q of around  0.7. 
I am not surprised  by von Furstenberg's  observation  that  q itself  is not 
easily predictable.  Keynes rightly  emphasized  that long-range  profit  ex- 
pectations  contain,  for all practical  purposes,  a high  degree  of autonomy 
or exogeneity.  They cannot  simply  be forecast  on the basis of past  events. 
Von Furstenberg  himself  stresses  the importance  of contemporary  capac- 
ity utilization,  but admits  he is puzzled  as to why it should  be important 
for long-lived  investments.  After all, the effect of a year or two of tem- 
porary  excess capacity  on the marginal  efficiency  of capital  should  not be 
large.  The importance  of the variable  must  derive  from expectations.  But 
expectations  are  likely to be related  differently  to utilization  in 1977 than 
they were in 1937, 1957, or 1967. The current  business  cycle is unlike 
any other  in the postwar  years. It seems  to have destroyed  business  con- 
fidence  that recessions  and slumps  are temporary  aberrations.  An advan- 
tage of q is that it registers  those expectations  and  balances  them against 
capital  costs. 
I doubt that, in the final analysis,  the answer  lies in a single letter of 
the alphabet,  be it q or M or any other.  We do not observe  marginal  q, 
and  many  things  change  the relationship  between  marginal  q and average 
q. In addition,  the relation of q to investment  depends on adjustment 
costs and  these  may change  over time. 
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emphasis  to his R2 calculation.  He is comparing  the variation  of the de- 
pendent  variable  from its mean with the variance  of residuals  from the 
AOLS regression  computed  on the assumption  that the previous  year's 
residual  is zero. But the latter  residuals  need not sum to zero in any  par- 
ticular  sample.  If there  is a large  residual  in the period  immediately  pre- 
ceding  the sample  period (as there  was in Ciccolo's  investment-q  regres- 
sions), the sample residuals may have a nonzero mean and a larger 
variance  around  zero than the deviations  of the dependent  variable  from 
its mean.  It seems to me more appropriate  to subtract  the mean  residual 
from each of the residuals  in carrying  out this computation. 
I would also like to note that measurement  problems-in  particular, 
those associated  with the real capital stock-make  it impossible  to be 
sure that the natural  or normal  value of a statistical  q is any particular 
number-one, less than one, or more than one. Von Furstenberg  points 
out that  in a model with vintage  capital,  only the newest  capital  would  be 
expected  to have qs greater  than or equal to one, so that the average  q 
would be below one. But there are also opposing  factors, such as the 
market capitalization  of  nontangible assets, goodwill, and monopoly 
rights,  that would push the measured  value of q above  one. Fortunately, 
what matters  for empirical  work is the movement  of q, not its average 
level. 
In conclusion,  on von Furstenberg's  view, with inflation  tapering  off 
and capacity utilization  improving  in the current  recovery,  investment 
should do well. On the other hand, for confidence,  monetary,  or other 
reasons,  q is still low, and so I expect a weak investment  performance. 
Perhaps  we should make a bet. For the good of the economy,  though,  I 
hope I turn  out to be wrong. 
George  M. von Furstenberg:  LoveLl  and  Tobin  have  both  criticized  my use 
of adjusted  q as a variable  in investment  equations.  They are  not alone;  I 
have  heard  even  stronger  criticisms  from  other  participants.  That  is clearly 
the most controversial  piece of methodology  in my paper, and hence I 
would  like to explain  my reasoning  on it. 
There are conceivably  factors  that influence  investment  rates without 
affecting  q, other  factors  that  influence  q without  affecting  investment,  and 
still others  that simultaneously  or sequentially  influence  investment  rates 
and q. If it were  known  that the last factors  affect  investment  only condi- 
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causation  would  be implied  that  would  have  investment  rates  linked  prop- 
erly to q and not to these other variables,  whose influence  on q may be 
changing.  The existence  of such  an exclusive  hierarchical  relationship  can- 
not be disproved  by estimating  the effects  of the correlates  of q on invest- 
ment  by running  them  jointly  with the adjusted  q and  finding  their  coeffi- 
cients to be significant.  Rather,  it is disproved  by finding  that including 
these  other  variables  raises  the explanatory  power  of the estimating  equa- 
tion and  reduces  the degree  of autocorrelation  of the error  terms. 
Assume,  however,  that the opposite  is known  and that  q is guaranteed 
to have no effect  on investment  though  it is (imperfectly)  correlated  with 
several  or all of the factors  influencing  investment.  Then running  unad- 
justed  q together  with  these  other  variables  would  distort  their  coefficients 
to the extent  that  coefficient  splitting  caused  the coefficient  estimated  on q 
to be nonzero.  In that case, runs  with the adjusted  q would  yield the cor- 
rect coefficients  on these other variables.  Of course, one would do even 
better  by simply  dropping  q altogether.  However,  suppose  that there  are 
some factors  not identified  in the regression  that influence  q and thereby 
investment  rates;  then even though  changes  in q have no causal  effect  on 
investment  rates, runs with adjusted  q would continue  to be justified  to 
the extent  that such changes  arise from any other  factor  included  in the 
regression.  Whether  one would  like to look at the coefficient  set estimated 
with the adjusted  or the unadjusted  q thus depends  on one's  priors,  and I 
felt the reader  should  be given  a choice.  Thanks  to the discussants,  I now 
recognize,  however,  that I may have prejudiced  this choice by emphasiz- 
ing the results  obtained  with the adjusted  q in multiple  regressions. 
General  Discussion 
John Shoven  raised  the problem  of accurately  measuring  the marginal 
q that is relevant  to investment  decisions.  He suggested  that, in the face 
of a significant  technological  innovation  or some other  structural  shift  in 
the economy, such as the rise in oil prices, existing  capital  might  fall in 
value, average  q would drop,  but marginal  q might  rise reflecting  an in- 
crease  in the attractiveness  of new investment. 
Robert  Hall felt that the persistence  of q at disequilibrium  levels for 
long periods  of time was a puzzle  as perplexing  as the persistence  of dis- 
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legedly long adjustment  lags in the investment  process  did not provide  a 
convincing  explanation.  Alan Greenspan  did not regard  such  persistence 
as a vexing problem:  the market  might well harbor  optimistic  or pessi- 
mistic notions that took time to dissipate.  He cited the long-sustained 
postwar  concern  about  stagnation-"the Montgomery  Ward  syndrome." 
Robert  J. Gordon  agreed,  noting  that  underestimates  persisted  in postwar 
inflationary  expectations  since people kept anticipating  recessions  and 
price  declines. 
Greenspan  also reported  that he had found it useful to use average 
stock  prices  divided  by the cost of new plant  and equipment  as an invest- 
ment indicator.  Obviously,  the level of that ratio had no meaningful  in- 
terpretation  (unlike the level of q),  but its movements  over time re- 
sembled  those of q. He believed  that  this simpler  measure  might  actually 
be preferable,  since he was skeptical  of the equal weighting  by q of the 
valuation  of debt  and  equity  securities. 
Various participants  explored the meaning of corporate  managers' 
bucking  the tides of the capital market  with their investment  decisions. 
Von Furstenberg  elaborated  his view that they might  well disagree  with 
the verdict  about  the economy  that  the market  was conveying.  They  might 
believe that it was displaying  an overly sensitive  reaction  to short-run 
cyclical conditions,  and they might expect a good profit  from investing 
that would convince  the market  in the future,  in spite of the low current 
level of q. Hall expressed  his dissatisfaction  with  the  implication  that  man- 
agers  are willing  to invest  when q is 0.7, thereby  instantly  losing 30 per- 
cent of their stockholders'  money. But von Furstenberg  stressed  the ob- 
vious  fact that  they  did  not simply  pay out all their  cash  in dividends  when 
q was low and did not even increase  the payout ratio measured  after 
adding  gains  from  the reduction  in real  indebtedness  to the profits  of non- 
financial  corporations.  William  Fellner  distinguished  between  the decision 
to invest and the method  of financing  investment.  He found it plausible 
that,  if firms  were relatively  bullish  about  their  own stocks  in a depressed 
market,  they  would  wait  before  selling  equity  but might  invest  and  finance 
that investment  by other  means  in the interim.  Arthur  Okun  pointed  out 
that  firms  always  have the alternative  of buying  back their  own equity  or 
of making  acquisition  offers  to other  firms  when  they are  more  optimistic 
than  the market.  It was  puzzling  to him  that  firms  do not buy  some  of their 
own equity more often. Hall suggested  that another aspect of today's 
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be rational  for firms  to invest  in physical  assets  even at low returns  when 
the alternative  was holding  a financial  asset with a negative  or zero real 
after-tax  rate  of return. 
Martin  Feldstein  differed  with von Furstenberg's  characterization  of 
his results  as having  cast doubt  upon the explanatory  power  of q. Point- 
ing to the size and significance  of the coefficients,  Feldstein  believed  that 
the paper  had shown  that  q was indeed  important.  To be sure,  it was diffi- 
cult to predict  q or to link its movements  clearly  to monetary  and fiscal 
policy variables.  Feldstein  expressed  some reservations  about  the statisti- 
cal estimates.  Although  von Furstenberg  had  been meticulous  in his treat- 
ment  of the autocorrelation  problem,  in Feldstein's  view  he had  not taken 
seriously  enough  the problems  raised  by the endogenous  nature  of some 
of the variables;  those called for methods other than ordinary  least 
squares. 
Von Furstenberg  stressed  that  the explanatory  power  of the investment 
equation  that  used q derived  from  its correcting  highly  serially  correlated 
errors.  The equation  contained  an initially  huge  and  systematic  underpre- 
diction  for the period 1952-64, whose extent  could be gauged  by noting 
that the equation  predicted  a level of investment  less than half of the 
actual value in the first  period. But the very high value of p introduces 
a statistical  self-correction  process, and the equation  gets credit  for this 
as part  of its explained  variation.  Agreeing  with  the author  on the serious- 
ness of this defect,  Frederic  Mishkin  noted  that  major  errors  might  occur 
when an equation  with this property  was used for longer-term  forecasts 
where less use could be made of error  terms.  William  Brainard  agreed 
that  the  pattern  of errors  suggests  a specification  error,  but  noted  that  when 
the q equation  was used to forecast out of sample  up to eight quarters 
ahead  it had performed  quite  well, even without  the use of the "unavoid- 
able" out-of-sample  forecast errors.  Nevertheless,  it is apparent  that if 
the equation  is to be used for such purposes,  more attention  should  be 
paid to finding  a structural  specification  that does not depend  so heavily 
on the first-order  autoregressive  correction,  and that would presumably 
do better  in minimizing  the  longer-term  forecast  errors. 